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Institutional Competency: Some Reflections on

Judicial Activism in the Realm of Forum
Allocation Between State and Federal Courts
JAMES M. FIScHER*
Recently, an eminent scholar proposed that issues of institutional competency are related to legal doctrines controlling access to courts. That scholar theorized that federal
courts could properly fashion forum allocation "principles"
from considerations of institutional competence. Professor
Fischer discusses, in a critical vein, the necessary assumptions
underlying that theory. He develops the argument that considerationof issues of institutional competence by the judiciary not only represents an unwarranted intrusion into the
power and prerogative of Congress, but also is damaging to
the judiciary as a public institution.
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INTRODUCTION

Since the formation of the United States of America, the coexistence of state and federal courts has vividly demonstrated
the commitment to federalism' that underlies our bifurcated system of law and government. Of course, the relationship between
state and federal courts, like the relationship between nation
states, has not always been smooth and harmonious. The nature
of that relationship, however, has invariably served as a benchmark for assessing the character of federalism existent in the
United States at any particular point in time.
In the beginning, the state courts were considered the dominant guarantors of the political and social values that had found
expression in the form of constitutional government that became
indigenous to the American experience. Only grudgingly did the
states concede jurisdiction over these matters to the federal government, enabling it to implement a federal system of courts
wherein the judicial power of the United States would find independent and sympathetic expression.' Indeed, the opponents of a
strong united government correctly perceived that a vibrant federal court system would serve as a powerful mechanism for the
aggrandizement of national power.' One of the great constitutional compromises prescribed that a federal judicial system of
courts of original jurisdiction would be authorized by constitutional grant subject to the political power in the Congress to control and regulate such original jurisdiction.4 Hence, the federal
court system was constrained from its creation by the branch of
government most clearly under the control of the several states.'
1. Federalism can be descriptively defined as the vertical distribution of power between the national government and the states. G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 400 (9th ed. 1975). From a normative perspective, however, a meaningful formula to prescribe the proper scope of power exercisable by either the national
government or the states, or both, has not been devised. Federalism seems to constitute
the proper, though indefinable, equilibrium between the centripetal tendencies of the national government and the centrifugal tendencies of the states.
2. See 1 J. GOEBEL, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS 217-24 (1971).
3. Id. at 212-13.
4. Id. at 223-24.
5. The Articles of Confederation had set up a system of voting by states, id. at 222-

23. The states suffered a loss of power by reason of the change to the constitutional system of proportional representation and popular election to the lower assembly of the Congress. They were, however, visibly integrated into the higher assembly through U.S.

CONST. art. 1, § 3 which provides: "The Senate

. .

. shall be composed of two Senators

from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof...; and each Senator shall have one

Vote."
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In the first 150 years following that great compromise, few
would have disputed that control over access to federal courts
was properly vested in the Congress, i.e., subject to allocation as
Congress deemed appropriate. Where access to a federal court
was provided by Congress, that mode of access was mandatory
upon the court;6 where Congress had declined to provide access,
that decision was also controlling.7 Starting approximately fifty
years ago, however, the theretofore accepted model of congressional control over access to federal courts began to be eroded'
and shifted from Congress to the Supreme Court of the United
States. That shift in control was manifested most dramatically
in the development of justiciability concepts,' the expansion of
6. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264 (1821). In Cohens, the Court dealt
with the issue of whether the Supreme Court had appellate jurisdiction to review writs of
error from state court proceedings where one party was a state and the other a citizen of
that state. In determining that the Court did have jurisdiction, Chief Justice Marshall
stated: "It is most true that this Court will not take jurisdiction if it should not: but it is
equally true, that it must take jurisdiction if it should. The judiciary cannot, as the
legislature may, avoid a measure because it approaches the confines of the constitution."
Id. at 404.
7. See Capron v. Van Noorden, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 125, 126 (1804). The Court held
that the lower court had a duty to determine whether it had jurisdiction, as the consent
of the parties did not suffice to grant the court jurisdiction to hear the case.
8. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), seems to mark the transition from
predominate congressional control to sustained and largely successful judicial control
over the question of access to courts. In Frothingham, the Court held that federal courts
had no jurisdiction over a controversy unless it was of a justiciable nature: the parties
had to demonstrate not only that a statute was unconstitutional, but also that they had
incurred, or were in immediate danger of incurring, direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the statute. The Court also required that the injury sustained be unique to
the parties, not one suffered in common with the general population. Id. at 488.
* The selection of Frothingham is somewhat arbitrary, although there are good reasons
for selecting this decision as signifying the beginning of judicial attempts to assume a
dominant position over control of access to federal courts. Some commentators argue that
judicial decisions construing the "arising under" language of general federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970), constitute a sustained judicial intrusion into the previously forbidden area of forum allocation decisionmaking. See, e.g., Cohen, The Broken
Compass: The Requirement that a Case Arise "Directly" Under Federal Law, 115 U. PA.
L. Rzv. 890 (1967). Nonetheless, Frothingham did mark the introduction of largely pragmatic considerations into the forum allocation decision. On the basis of hindsight, it appears that judicial attitudes toward access to federal courts have been more independent
in the era after Frothingham than they were before it.
9. One hesitates to even suggest (by analogy or example) a definition of the term
"justiciability." A bolder soul is Professor Tribe. See L. TRIBE, AMECAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw § 3-7 (1978). Professor Tribe describes the concept in terms of institutional psychology and maintains that justiciability is often determined according to how the Supreme
Court Justices perceive their role and the limitations placed on their powers by the "case
or controversy" language of U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. Within his discussion of the concept
of justiciability, Professor Tribe includes the doctrines related to: advisory opinions,
mootness, ripeness, injury in fact, political questions, standing and collusive suits. Id. at
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postponement concepts, such as the abstention doctrine'0 and
the development of access-controlling devices, such as the
Younger Doctrine." Most recently, judicial control over access to
federal courts was evidenced by the limitation of the scope of
post-conviction habeas corpus review of state criminal
judgments.'"
It is this recent shift in control over access to federal courts
from Congress to the Supreme Court that is the focus of this article. The question addressed is thus different in kind from most
recent inquiries into the nature of the relationship between Congress and the federal courts. The concern here is not the power or
right of Congress to create or abolish federal courts;' 3 rather, it is
the identification of the proper governmental entity to determine
the allocation of decisionmaking responsibility between state
and federal courts.
A proper regard for our federal system of government necessitates that questions concerning access to courts of original jurisdiction be decided with due regard for the different spheres of
responsibility that our political system places on institutions of
§§ 3-7 to 3-29.
10. See generally Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The Scope of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. Rav. 1071 (1974). In cases where a federal constitutional claim is based on an unsettled question of state law, this doctrine requires the
federal court to postpone its decision until after the state court settles the state law question. The doctrine is designed to minimize the risk that federal courts will misinterpret
state law or unnecessarily adjudicate constitutional issues. Id. at 1077-78.
11. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1972). The Younger doctrine is critically exaimed in L. TRIus, supra note 9, at § 3-41.
The rules that make up the doctrine were designed to limit the power of federal courts in order to preserve the autonomy of state governments. The limitations dealt specifically with the ability of the federal court to enjoin or
grant declaratory relief against unconstitutional state action in instances
where these claims could be brought up in state proceedings.
Id. at 152.
12. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). The Supreme Court limited habeas
corpus access to federal courts by denying habeas corpus relief where the state court had
already afforded the petitioner an opportunity to litigate fully a fourth amendment claim
arising out of an allegedly unconstitutional search and seizure.
13. See, e.g., Eisenberg, Congressional Authority to Restrict Lower Federal Court
Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 498 (1974); Redish & Woods, CongressionalPower to Control
the Jurisdictionof Lower Federal Courts: A CriticalReview and a New Synthesis, 124 U.
PA. L. REv. 45 (1975). The contemporary furor over mandatory busing of school children
produced a flurry of legislation designed to limit the jurisdiction of federal courts to order
busing in school desegregation cases. The legislation gave rise to significant scholarship
dealing with the topic of congressional control over federal courts. A representative sample of the material is collected in P. BATOR, P. MISKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART
& WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYsTEM 79-80 (2d ed. Supp. 1977)
[hereinafter cited as HART & WECHSLER].
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government.' The question of access to a court is a functional
component of the demands of our political process. Such a question must address the issue of political responsibility for deciding
where certain cases are to be decided because where cases are
decided will often have a profound impact upon how they are
decided. 5
The arguments and conclusions presented in this article are
organized as follows: First, I will explore the propriety of an independent judicial decision regarding forum allocation between
state and federal courts. The conclusion advanced is that sufficiently definable criteria necessary to measure empirically the
institutional quality of state fora as a whole, as opposed to federal fora as a whole, do not exist. This lack of empirically definable criteria undercuts any proposal which would assign to the
judiciary the task of rendering forum allocation decisions based
upon criteria such as the relative general institutional competency of courts.
Second, I will address the issue of where the forum allocation decision should be made. The conclusion advanced is that
the Constitution of the United States commits the forum allocation decision pro tanto to the Congress and that this separation
of power and function has historically been recognized by the
Supreme Court. Hence, a federal court has leeway to make a forum allocation decision only to the extent that Congress has duly
committed such a power to that court pursuant to statute.
Finally, I will discuss the weight that should be given the
14. The plurality opinion in Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) does not suggest a
purely legal texture for the question. In Elrod, the Court detailed the unique relationship
of federal and state courts in the context of dealing with the politically inspired firing of

non -civil-service county employees. The Court rejected the argument that the hiring and
firing of executive officers was a matter solely committed to the executive branch, stating: "The short answer to this argument is that the separation-of-powers principle, like
the political-question doctrine, has no applicability to the federal judiciary's relationship
to the States." Id. at 352. This may suggest that the relationship between the federal
judiciary and the state judiciary is solely a problem for the respective judiciaries to re-

solve. Such an argument, however, would ignore the role given to Congress under art. III
to control that relationship. See notes 60 to 88 and accompanying text infra. Certainly,
the decision that Congress would control the relationship between state and federal

courts, which arose from a fundamental compromise during the Constitutional Convention, see note 5 and accompanying text supra, of necessity warrants dismissal of any
notion that the federal judiciary possesses the power to determine the whole of its subject
matter jurisdiction.
15. That a case may be decided differently depending on where it is adjudicated
does not justify result-oriented forum allocation decisions, as I shall explain in part IV of

this article.
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pervasive assumption that federal courts are, as judicial institutions, of better quality than state courts. The argument advanced here is that constitutional decisions of such sensitivity as
the proper allocation of the federal judicial power should not be
judicially controlled; to assign such a responsibility to the courts
on no firmer foundation than mere speculation would undermine
the image of judicial integrity. Moreover, even if we were to accept the prevalent assumptions which encourage the judiciary to
make forum allocation decisions, such a process would be rational only if we knew a priori what end results were the "correct" ones. Evaluation of an institution's competence to decide
cases can be undertaken only if we have already clarified our
goals; we cannot evaluate the means unless we define our ends.
It is the absence of agreed upon concrete goals that makes reliance upon the measure of institutional competence, as a forum
allocation determinant, a counterintuitive method of analysis.
II.

THE ABSENCE OF SATISFACTORY CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING
INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE

There is a recognized lack of empirical research and a paucity of other sound, accepted modes of investigation, study and
analysis, on the topic of what institutional competency is and
how it affects the judicial process on a system-wide basis." Even
16. A distinction, however, does appear to exist between the methodology suggested
by certain commentators and that suggested by the Court to define "competency." The
term is not used identically by both parties. As used by the Court in Stone v. Powell,
428 U.S. 465, 493-94 n.35 (1976), and by implication in Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420
U.S. 592, 610-11 (1975), the term "competency" appears to connote the existence of empirically determinable criteria that may be used to measure qualitatively the ability of a
court to adjudicate. Professor Neuborne, on the other hand, appears to use the term
"competency" in a result-oriented, rather than an empirical, fashion. Under this standard, competency is principally measured by the likelihood that certain objectives or
goals will be realized by the judicial process. Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 1105, 1106 (1977).
"Competency" also may*be defined in a manner which neither the Court nor
Neuborne address, but which is more descriptive of the actual roles the federal courts
and the Congress have come to accept by compulsion of the Constitution and as a byproduct of history. For forum allocation purposes, this definition of competency has a
political connotation and consists of a court's, either state or federal, ability to render
decisions which are acceptable to the Congress. This means that Congress' power to allocate the federal judicial power under art. I provides it with a significant and substantial
political weapon to control the tenor of judicial decisions which involve matters of federal
interest and concern. Hence, for purposes of formulating general rules of forum allocation, competency would be measured by Congress' allocation of the judicial function. Cf.
Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 435-36 (1944) (upholding jurisdictional time limits
on federal courts to hear cases on price control violations).
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proponents of the use of competency criteria for forum allocation

decisions acknowledge' that their judgments to date are based
largely upon speculation. 7 Thus, in the process of defining the
impact and effect institutional competence criteria ought to have
on the forum allocation decision, problems result from the inability to define just what institutional competency means and
from uncertainty over the state of our problem-solving
methodology.
This should not suggest that considerations of institutional
competency are never appropriate. Certainly in the face of a factual showing of state institutional prejudice, inhospitality or bias
to federal claims, a federal court has the duty to adjudicate the
dispute even in cases where state remedies have not been exhausted. 18 Nevertheless, the theory that nationwide, general
rules regarding forum allocations between state and federal
courts can be developed is erroneous; the notion that concepts of
institutional competency can be generalized as easily as they are
particularized warrants caution on the part of the federal courts
before they proceed too far in their attempts to define and determine ab initio their own jurisdiction.
Professor Neuborne recently described several important criteria that he asserted belied any claim of equivalent institutional
competency (parity) between state and federal courts. 9 To prove
that the institutional competence of federal trial courts is superior to that of state trial courts, Professor Neuborne relied on
three basic arguments: (1) that federal judges as a whole possess
greater technical competence than state judges and are better
able to follow Supreme Court pronouncements because they better understand them;20 (2) that the "psychological set" of federal
judges render them "more likely to enforce constitutional rights
vigorously";" and (3) that because of their lifetime tenure federal judges are isolated from majoritarian pressures, freeing them
to make unpopular constitutional decisions with no fear of
17. See Neuborne, supra note 16, at 1116. Neuborne admits that no study exists
comparing the relative performance of state and federal courts in enforcing constitutional
rights. Id.at 1116 n.46.
18. See, e.g., Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561, 563-64, 569-70 (1947) (Rutledge, J.,

concurring) (state procedures for redress so inadequate that federal court was compelled
to grant habeas corpus relief before the state remedies were exhausted). See also HART &
WECHSLER, supra note 13, at 1487-92.
19. Neuborne, supra note 16.
20. Id. at 1121-24.
21. Id.at 1124-27
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reprisal.2
These considerations provide a convenient perspective from
which to assess whether sufficient competency criteria exist to
enable generalized forum allocation decisions to be made by the
judiciary. Of course, there are other reasons upon which a forum
allocation may be predicated. Lawyers might consider such factors as the congestion of court calendars, the rules of evidence or
the judicial assignment system (e.g., master calendar as opposed
to individual calendar assignment), important reasons for selecting one court over another. These factors, however, do not constitute an inherent infirmity of the court as a court, which would
render it incompetent to decide a case before it. On the other
hand, the factors set forth by Professor Neuborne-technical
competence, psychological set and insulation from majoritarian
pressures-do focus upon the competency of courts qua courts to
decide particular types of cases. Hence, it is from the perspective
of these latter factors that the institutional competency issue
will be addressed.
A.

The Proper Perspective for Institutional Comparison

The first step in assessing institutional capacity for federal
constitutional decisionmaking is to ascertain what is to be compared to what. Professor Neuborne, a believer in federal institutional superiority, noted a tendency to compare federal district
courts with state intermediate appellate courts. 3 He criticized
this methodology as not evincing a fair consideration of factors
such as the expense, delay and inconvenience that are occasioned if institutional equivalence does not exist until the appellate level is reached. Thus, he concluded that the appropriate
institutional comparison should be between federal district
courts and their state trial court counterparts.
A hierarchical view of the decisionmaking process, however,
does not present a thorough and accurate view of the whole. This
approach fails to take account of the many cases of federal interest
that either do not long remain at the trial level or that can enter
the federal trial courts for the first time only after a lengthy sojourn through the state judicial system. For example, in matters
of habeas corpus for state prisoners, the federal trial courts first
22. Id. at 1127-30. Majoritarian pressures are equated with "powerful local inter-

ests." Id. at 1127.
23. Id. at 1118-19.

19801

INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCY

entertain the issue after appellate level review in the state system.2" Moreover, many cases involving hard questions of state
interest and individual rights involve situations in which the focus is upon the decision to be rendered by an appellate court.
This is particularly true in the case of public interest litigation
where jurisdictionwide resolution of the problem is desired. 5
The merits of limiting comparisons of institutional equivalence to
correlative trial courts seems especially inapt when we recognize
the prevalent use of immediate appeal procedures, 6 the extensive scope of appellate review of questions of law and facts27
24. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254 (b)-(c) (1970).
25. It should not be surprising that attorneys who represent unpopular litigants
seeking broad jurisdictibnwide relief would prefer a court capable of providing the desired
relief. The federal district court is generally perceived as fully capable of providing the
desired relief. See, e.g., Newman v. Alabama, 349 F. Supp. 278 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (state
penal system subject to compliance order); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387 & 344 F.
Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), enforcing 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), modified sub
nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974) (state mental health system subject to compliance order); Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 292 F. Svpp. 363 (M.D.
Ala. 1968) (statewide desegregation of schools ordered); Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp.
707 (M.D. Ala. 1956), afJ'd, 352 U.S 903 (1956) (during the height of the Montgomery bus
boycott, city busses were ordered desegregated). Indeed, the intrusion of the federal judiciary into areas traditionally the sole domain of state prerogative has promoted the inevitable scholarly backlash; Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable Remedies, 30 STAN. L. REV. 661 (1978). Even if federal judicial intrusion into the
legislative domain of the states is curtailed, however, judicial intrusion as a whole may
not be, for broad equity actions brought by litigants seeking compliance .ith state and
federal constitutional guarantees are also finding their way into state courts. See, e.g.,
Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976) (statewide
equilization of school funding ordered); Sundance v. Municipal Court, CA 000257 (Mar.
20, 1978) (Superior Court, County of Los Angeles) (certain remedial changes ordered in
action commenced by "chronic, homeless, indigent alcoholics" to challenge the constitutionality of prosecutorial practices regarding judicial practices with respect to, and preand post-conviction policies relating to, disorderly conduct charges stemming from alcoholism. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(f) (West 1975). The extension of state judicial authority even beyond that exercised by federal courts has not gone unnoticed or unapplauded.
See Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HAIv. L.
REv. 489 (1977).
26. See, e.g., CAL. CtV. PRoc. CODE § 904.1(f) (West 1973), which provides: "An appeal may be taken from a superior court in the following cases:. . . . (f) From an order
granting or dissolving an injunction, or refusing to grant or dissolve an injunction."
Thus, attempts to constrain certain actions or conduct either by the government
(seeking to enjoin the complained of activity) or a party (seeking to enjoin government
interference) can be immediately appealed from the denial of the preliminary injunction.
Socialist Workers 1974 Cal. Campaign v. Brown, 53 Cal. App. 3d 879, 125 Cal. Rptr. 915
(Ct. App. 1975). Where time is of the essence, interlocutory appeals from ex parte applications may be appealed regardless of whether the application was contested below. See
Jolicoeur v. Mihaley, 5 Cal. 3d 565, 488 P.2d 1, 96 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1971).
27. The scope of factual review upon appeal has been liberal in the first amendment
area and only somewhat less extensive in the entire fourteenth amendment due process
area. See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 13, at 601-10. State courts have gener-
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and the tendency to appeal hard cases to higher courts.
Simply put, the argument for limiting institutional comparison to courts of the same systemic level does not adequately consider the vast panoply of procedural modalities by which issues
of federal interest and concern are raised and resolved. The argument is, in turn, undercut to the extent that it casts a misleading picture of the manner, mode and method by which legal doctrine is formulated. The focus upon expense, delay and
uncertainty as the determinant factors of institutional comparison asks too much and, in the end, proves too little.
Only by comparing judicial institutions as holistic systems
can a true basis for institutional comparison be achieved, if at
all. To treat all federal and state trial courts as independent
units, divorced from their appellate superstructures, calls to
mind the parable of the blind men examining the elephant. A
view of the American judicial process that examines only one aspect of it, such as trial courts, and does so in isolation, cannot be
expected to produce an accurate model of the whole. Nor can
even an accurate view of a part of a judicial system necessarily
be treated as representative of the whole system. 8 Simply put,
no level of any judicial system is an island; each level is interwoven into a totally interrelated and interdependent system.
B.

Technical Competence

The popular argument here focuses upon the professional
competence of the federal judge and of his staff, particularly his
law clerk. This argument proceeds upon the assumption that
with the assistance of a superior staff, the federal district judges
will better "analyze complex, often conflicting lines of authority"
ally applied a similarly liberal standard of review. This observation is not intended to
denigrate the importance of the factual record which accompanies the case through the
appellate process. Nonetheless, the present-day style of decisionmaking in areas which
raise questions of state interest and individual rights seems to place less emphasis upon
the determination of fact by the lower court. While parties are bound by the record, the
courts are often willing to reevaluate the proper construction and application of the facts
in the record in light of policies perceived as controlling the resolution of the disputes.
Making a record before a lower court thus becomes a major goal. See also Wright, The
Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 MINN. L. REV. 751, 778-81 (1957).
28. For example, good and bad judges exist at every level of the judiciary. Yet, is
any court capable of factually supporting a generalization that federal courts are institutionally superior to state courts? How many judges, good or bad, does it take for federal
courts or state courts, as institutions, to assume a like reflection? If that percentage can
be ascertained, have federal courts met it? Have state courts? These unanswerable ques-

tions strip the alluring veneer from the hierarchical argument.
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and "produce more competently written, more persuasive opinions" than their state court counterparts."9
Traditionally, an appointment to the federal bench has been
considered a desirable position. It would seem logical to expect
that the most competent individuals would gravitate to such positions if a merit system were used to select federal judges. Nevertheless, because the selection of federal judges is a political
process of a high magnitude, it would seem logical to expect that
competency is not necessarily the prime criterion for appointment to the federal bench. 0 Moreover, no test or standard has
29. Neuborne, supra note 16, at 1120.
30. For an amusing account of the highly political method by which many federal
judges are selected, see Totenberg, Will Judges Be Chosen Rationally? 60 JUD. 92, 93-99
(1976). Ms. Totenberg also notes that the highly touted screening process effected by the
ABA may be more apparent than real:
Cases . . . where an appointment is made despite ABA Committee disapproval, are extremely rare-they make up less than 1 percent of all appointments. The reason is that neither the president nor the ABA can afford the
messy fight that ensues when such an appointment is made. The ABA almost
invariably loses, because the senators resent the ABA's tromping on their prerogatives and perceive the ABA as looking down on politicians. (They are
probably right on this last score.) The president, on the other hand, usually
gets a lot of bad publicity for making an unqualified appointment.
So both sides prefer to avoid public fights, the president to protect his
image, the ABA to preserve its influence and stature in the judge-screening
process. The result is often negotiation and a change in the nominee's rating.
The Justice Department may present the committee with some "new" piece
of information, and the committee changes its mind about the rating. Prof.
Harold Chase, who conducted a study of judicial selection for the Brookings
Institution, surveyed a two-year period in the Kennedy administration and
found that between the ABA's informal and formal reports on nominees,
there was a change in nearly 30 percent of the ratings, usually resulting in an
upgrading.
Id. at 96. Of course, problems similar to those attendant to the selection of federal judges
are not unknown to the states. See Traynor, Who Can Best Judge the Judges?, 53 VA. L.
REv. 1266 (1967) (commenting upon the popular and political dissatisfaction resulting
from popular elections of judges, short terms and small salaries). As noted, however, by a
respected worker in the field: "None of these observations seem to be empirically demonstrable. At least, there is now no data which convincingly demonstrates that any particular differences in the qualities of judicial systems are related to differing modes of selection." P. CARRINGTON & B. BABCOCK, CIVIL PROCEDURE, CASES AND COMMENTS ON THE
PROCESS OF ADJUDICATION 128 (2d ed. 1977). An additional perspective worth considering
is that of Professor Rosenberg, who utilized questionnaires submitted to 144 trial judges
of varying experience in an attempt to ascertain what must be the first question of any
analysis of judicial competency-what judicial qualities demonstrate judicial competency. Rosenberg, The Qualities of Justices-Are They Strainable?44 TEX. L. REv. 1063
(1966).
At the risk of extending an overly long note, I would like to point out that the qualities which by consensus were deemed most important (moral courage, decisiveness, reputation for fairness and uprightness, patience, good health (physical and mental) and consideration for others) are, for the most part, difficult, if not impossible, to predetermine
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been suggested by which judicial competency can be measured.
We are thus forced to rummage about for characteristics which
may shed some light upon the question of how competent a particular judge is. Such incidents of office as life tenure, superior
staff and insulation from the cynicism engendered by day-to-day
law enforcement are often suggested as leading one intuitively to
conclude that the federal judge who possesses these incidents of
office is more competent that the state judge who lacks them.
Unfortunately, the nexus between these incidents of office and
the conclusion of greater competency has not been established,
either intuitively or empirically. Life tenure might either protect
a judge from majoritarian pressure3 ' or allow a judge to insulate
himself from the legitimate demands of a modern society. A superior staff might mean a more argumentative, intellectual staff
to one individual or a more pliant staff to another. In short, the
advantages derived from reliance upon incidents of office to measure a judge's competency will be rare, while the mischief produced by it, constant and pervasive.
This same observation holds true with regard to the generation of written opinions by the bench. It is perhaps a truism (but
still worth stating) that the failure of trial judges to produce
written opinions in support of their decisions is distressing. Being required to articulate in writing the reasoning which induced
it to come to a particular decision aids the court more than any
other factor in proving that it has thought the problem through
and has come to a supportable resolution of the dispute." The
in a judicial candidate. As more precisely put by P.

CARRINGTON

& B.

BABCOCK,

supra, at

129-30:
A striking feature of these highest ranking attributes is that they tend to focus upon the personality or person of the candidate-what he is rather than
what he has done; his innate or intrinsic qualities rather than his "external"
attainments. They are more concerned with temperament, disposition, character, and attitude than with background, training, or formal achievement.

Except for good health, they tend to be subjective and difficult to recognize
and measure. Furthermore, they are qualities that do not relate uniquely to
law, its study or its practice, and are not peculiar to lawyers or judges. They
do not clearly differentiate those who are best equipped to be trial judges
from other persons of virtue.
31. See notes 49-56 and accompanying text infra.
32. See K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 27 n.19 (1960).
The matters suggested in the text [a written opinion] patently reach in
effect beyond the furtherance of reckonability; they lead, for instance, toward
not merely continuance but cumulation and refinement or refreshment of wisdom. They add the individual's labor and pondered thought to his intuition
and inspiration. They put well-nigh every opinioned deciding through something of a ripening process. Many an appellate judge agrees with Traynor,
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benefits, however, of opinion writing neither provide any empirical proof nor otherwise establish either that federal trial judges
write more opinions or that those opinions are of a better quality
than those produced by state court judges. Very little is known
about the reporting of opinions by federal trial judges.33 Probably
even less is known about the reporting of opinions by state trial
judges.34 Certainly the existence of unofficial reporters for written
opinions from the federal district courts creates the impression of
a more active federal judiciary. Yet, the number of published
opinions, itself small, is not indicative of the general practice. 5
that he has found no test of a decision which has the rigor offered by having
an opinion to compose. The opinion-system holds relatively steady, moreover,
not merely the succession of upshots, but the body of doctrine, the ways of
work, and (not to be forgotten) the men's training in their office. And despite
the increasing complexity of legal doctrine and despite, again, all that can be
said about the power of skilled words to mask what has been done, there is in
the opinion a real pressure to account to lay and legal public, and a real
wherewithal for semi-check-up on the work.
The fact that benefits are realized by the court in preparing an opinion, however, does
not necessarily mean that all opinions ought to be published. See Jacobstein, Some Reflections on the Control of the Publication of Appellate Court Opinions, 27 STAN. L. REV.
791 (1974); Vestal, PublishingDistrict Court Opinions in the 1970's, 17 Loy. L. REv. 673
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Publishing District Court Opinions].
33. See Publishing District Court Opinions, supra note 32. The notion that federal
judges produce more written opinions is no doubt enhanced by the existence of numerous
reporters which publish the decisions of federal trial judges. See, e.g., Vestal, A Survey of
FederalDistrict Court Opinions: West PublishingCompany Reports, 20 Sw. L.J. 63, 68-69
(1966). Certainly, the knowledge that what is written will find its way into print must
spur many a judge (and his law clerk) to write the type of opinion he otherwise would
not. This is so because opinions published in the Federal Supplement are generally not
solicited from the judge. Rather, the West Publishing Company, the publisher of Federal
Supplement, "contacts each federal district court judge when he is appointed and notifies him that the company is interested in publishing opinions which he wishes to have
included in the West Publications. Although the West Publishing Company makes the
final decision, it is hard to imagine that the company would refuse to publish an opinion
sent in by a judge." Id. at 77 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
34. Contrast with the extensive system for reporting federal trial court decisions, see
note 33 supra, the minimal attention given to state trial court opinions. See M. PICE &
H. BrrNER, EF'Ecrv LEGAL REsEARCH, 387-409 (1953). The state trial judge who considers writing an opinion cannot count on making a contribution to the ongoing development of the law. Rather, his contribution is limited to advising the parties to the litigation of his settlement of the controversy. Thus, the state trial judge, knowing his work
will be relied upon only within the confines of the controversy before him, must weigh the
benefits and burdens of opinion writing against the practical utility of preparing (or reviewing) findings of fact and conclusions of law. Finally, even when the state judge
prepares an opinion, he still may be required to prepare findings of fact and conclusions
of law; the opinion, however, appears to suffice in federal court. This practice, no doubt,
tends to encourage opinion writing by federal judges and discourage opinion writing by
state judges.
35. Among federal trial judges, the incidence of reported opinion writing varies significantly. For example, Professor Vestal has observed:
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State trial judges do prepare competently written, persuasive
opinions on difficult issues of law adjudicated before them. I
must admit that I share the assumption that federal trial judges
prepare written opinions with greater frequency than their state
counterparts, even though there are no doubt instances to the
contrary. But whether this assumption rests upon an exception
or is reflective of institutional dissimilarities between state and
federal trial courts is unknown. Since the perception of greater
federal opinion writing rests upon untested and possibly erroneous assumptions, it hardly provides a proper foundation for the
You will note that the number of published opinions [from the Fifth Circuit] rose from 259 (1962) to 293 (1963) to 377 (1968). Pages increased from 1105
to 1514. The increase, 1968 over 1962, for all practical purposes, occurred in
Lousiana (73), Texas (22), and Florida (20).
In examining what is happening now, it seems desirable to look at the
opinion writing practice with more care. . . . The ratio of opinions reported
to cases terminated is rather interesting. In Louisiana the district judges published one opinion for every 29 cases terminated. (In 1962 this was 1 for every
39). On the other hand, the ratio was 1 to 79 cases terminated in Texas and 1
for every 92 cases terminated in Florida. (1 to 113 in 1962).
The available statistics also show. the ratio of final opinions per terminations by court action. Mississippi has a ratio of 1 to 16. Louisiana has a ratio
of 1 to 26. Florida has a ratio of 1 to 56. The Mississippi figure is explained in
some measure by the fact that a relatively low percentage of the cases terminated by court action. The total figures on termination and opinion writing
and reporting should be noted. More than 22 thousand cases were terminated
in the circuit with only 277 number opinions reported by West Publishing
Company.
Another way to look at the available information is to examine the opinion writing practices of individual judges. [In reference to] the judges sitting
for the full fiscal year of 1968. . . . tilt should be noted that the opinion writing and reporting practices of the various judges vary considerably. One judge
from Texas had no opinion published; seven judges had a single opinion reported; nine judges had two opinions reported; six had three; seven had four.
Thus, thirty judges had four or fewer opinions published.
At the other end of the scale the top was 36 by one judge, followed by 22,
20, 17, 16, 15, and two at 14. These eight judges had 154 of the 377 opinions.
It also should be noted that six of these eight prolific judges are from
Louisiana.
[In reference to] the judges in the Fifth Circuit sitting the full fiscal year
1962. . . . [n]ote that a number of the judges served both full years. ...
Time has not allowed sufficient research into the reporting of opinions by district judges, however, a comparison of the two years allows certain tentative
observations. One might wonder whether the judges would write more or
fewer opinions after they had been on the bench for an additional five years.
As a group, they wrote and reported fewer opinions. In fiscal 1962, they reported 117 opinions; in 1968 they reported 82. There were some marked
changes. Judge 502 in Alabama went from 11 to 2. Judge 515 in Georgia went
from 6 to 1. On the other hand, Judge 501 in Alabama went from 5 to 10.
Publishing District Court Opinions, supra note 32, at 675-76.
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establishment of a doctrine of forum preference.
Federal judges may have a higher level of technical competence in particular geographic areas; however, this compliment
does not stand up as a generalization. In California, for example,
the caliber of state court judges, both trial and appellate, is
thought by many to be on par with that available in the federal
courthouse. In any event, since technical competence is such a
matter of individual predilection and disposition, generalization
must be recognized as dangerous and fraught with the potential
for error.
Someone has yet to demonstrate a relationship between institutional competence and the ability to follow Supreme Court
pronouncements. Whatever the level of general institutional receptivity toward established doctrine as binding or as persuasive
precedent, 37 individual personal judgment is both inevitable and
proper.3 8 The conscientious judge, state or federal, decides the
case according to the law. Judges who lack the ability to apply
the law to the facts pose a problem regardless of where they
preside.
An additional consideration is that the federal judicial system is not foolproof. Incompetent judges do exist and, in this
regard, the federal system is, at present, seriously undermined
because the only methods for removing federal judges are either
to impeach them or to insulate them from caseloads.3 9 These ineffective devices should be contrasted with the model plans now
used by many states to remove or censure incompetent and abusive judges.40 Even if the number of actual removals and cen36. I should think the same would be true in many of the states.
37. See Neuborne, supra note 16, at 1124-25.
38. Nor should individual personal judgment be ignored by overzealous allegiance to
an institutional norm. See Johnson, The Role of the Judiciary with Respect to the Other
Branches of Government, 11 GA. L. REv. 455, 466-67 (1977).
39. See, e.g., Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. 74 (1970)
(affirming, without reaching the issue, an order directing that no new cases or proceedings be assigned to plaintiff federal district court judge).
40. The difference in federal and state treatment is exemplified by the presence in
most states of a program for the review of questionable judicial conduct. The removal
provisions for each state are described in Gasperini, Anderson & McGinley, Judicial Removal in New York: A New Look, 40 FORDHAM L. REv. 1, 37-40 (1971). Provisions authorizing removal or lesser sanctions against errant judges have been developed either
through internal adoption of canons of judicial ethics by state courts, see Comment, The
Proceduresof Judicial Discipline, 59 MARQ. L. REv. 190, 199 (1976), or through legislative
control or constitutional provision. The California system (employing a Commission on
Judicial Qualifications) has been adopted by thirty-five states and represents the model
of accommodating the conflicting goals of judicial independence and judicial accountabil-
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sures has been small, the in terrorem effect of such models has
been sobering and clearly beneficial to the administration of
justice.
Inevitably, we deal with considerations that, rather than
demonstrating the greater institutional competency of one system over the other, point instead to the strengths and weaknesses of each system. Any attempt to match these institutional
considerations is futile. For example, even if one concedes that
the law clerks available to the federal judge are generally intellectually superior to those available to the state court judge, how
do you balance more "competent" law clerks against a model
program for removal of incompetent judges? Is it appropriate to
make nationwide assumptions where there are significant local
deviations? I would suggest that analytically one cannot and
should not. That trial attorneys attempt such feats every diay
through a process of speculation is immaterial. If judicial forum
allocation decisions could be predicated upon possibilities, the
variables introduced would be endless. As the number of variables precludes any reasoned prediction of the better, more competent forum, any meaningful conclusions regarding the institutional competency test for forum allocation are lost in a sea of
conjecture. Speculation is hardly the substance out of which one
should fashion a constitutional doctrine that would be predicated upon "principled" decisionmaking.
Behind the facade of the measurement of institutional competence lies the larger issue of what roles are appropriate for
state and federal courts to play in the federal system of government we espouse. Resolving that issue requires coming to grips
with whether the ultimate goal is to minimize the position of the
states and the state courts in the realm of exposition of constitutional doctrine and to reduce them to mere ministerial functionaries by transferring all major decisionmaking responsibilities to
the federal government and the federal courts. Such a goal is not
necessarily good or bad. It might be that the great compromise
of dual state and federal courts engineered by the founding fathers, which is discussed in Part III of this article, no longer
makes sense after two hundred years. Making such a determination, however, would require a basic theoretical reformulation of
the nature of federalism to which this country has adhered these
ity. See Frankel, Judicial Accountability, 49 L.A.B. BULL. 411 (1974); Comment, supra at
203. Federal efforts to control errant judges remain largely uncertain. See 65 A.B.A.J.
1459 (1979).
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past two centuries. Therefore, if reformulation is desired, it
ought to be made-at least in basic design-by Congress, the
constitutionally qualified political entity.4
C.

Psychological Set

It has been argued" that elitism, bureaucratic receptivity, and
the ivory tower syndrome43 constitute "a series of psychological
and attitudinal characteristics which render federal district
judges more likely to enforce constitutional rights vigorously.""
No modem empirical studies exist, however, that would support
the proposition that the federal judiciary, as compared to the
state judiciary, has a "superior" receptivity, on an institutional
basis, to Supreme Court pronouncements. 5 "Core" cases, in
which a judge seeks only to apply a legal rule, give rise to little
serious dispute; "penumbral" cases, in which the applicability
and meaning of a given decision may be matters of legitimate
contention, are a different matter altogether.4" The competent
judge, state or federal, does not give blind bureaucratic obedience to a prior decision without consideration of the context in
which the prior decision was rendered. Instead, as Llewelyn
stated:
An ignorant, and unskillful judge will find [the doctrine of
precedent] hard to use; the past will bind him. But the skillful judge-he whom we would make free-is thus made free.
41. See text accompanying notes 48-56 infra. Of course, Congress' power might not
be unfettered. Under National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), the federal
courts may have the power to review congressional actions which undermine the viability
of state government and state interest. But see Tushnet, Constitutional and Statutory
Analyses in the Law of Federal Jurisdiction, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1301 (1978) (arguing
that Congress has near unfettered discretion to allocate federal jurisdiction without contravening any judicially enforceable safeguards of federalism).
42. See Neuborne, supra note 16, at 1124-26.
43. The "ivory tower syndrome" is described as "[insulation] from the more cynicism-breeding dimensions of constitutional law." Id. at 1125.
44. Id. at 1124.
45. This statement is not intended to suggest that analyses of certain institutionwide
receptivity criteria have not been undertaken. See Grossman, Social Backgrounds and
Judicial Decision-Making, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1551 (1966); Haines, General Observation of
the Effects of Personal, Political,and Economic Influences in the Decisions of Judges, 17
ILL. L. REv. 96 (1922). The net result of such studies, however, has been to generate
speculation about the effect of these criteria upon the decisionmaking process, rather
than to test empirically the theory that federal judges are more receptive. I do not mean
to denigrate the efforts of competent scholars; empirical testing may be impossible due to
certain policies and values (e.g., right to privacy) inherent in our legal system.
46. Hart, Ascription of Responsibility and Rights, 49 Peoc. ARTISTOTELIAN SOC'Y 171
(1949).
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He has the knife in hand; and he can free himself.'"
Certainly, there are Supreme Court decisions of such overwhelming magnitude that they articulate a policy determination
of universal application. The task presented to courts in subsequent cases, however, is not overturning the enunciated holding,
but determining its parameters, its scope, its depth and its intended effect. It is no more proper to say that such psychological
factors as elitism, bureaucratic receptivity and the ivory tower
syndrome"8 demonstrate that federal courts are more competent
than state courts to decide constitutional cases than it is to say
that courts composed of judges with a particular judicial philosophy are more competent than courts composed of judges with a
different judicial philosophy. It might be true that a judge with
particular predilections will often render a decision consistent
with those predilections, but this tendency does not make that
judge more competent unless competency is defined as reaching
a particular decision. If competency means something else, however, if it connotes the obligation to render a decision consistent
with the law, to reason with precision, clarity and perception,
and to do justice in the particular case before the court, then the
particular psychological set of a judge should be immaterial in a
forum allocation decision. Labelling a judge competent because
of his predilections in certain categories of decisions could be
dangerous for it runs counter to promoting those very qualities
that we should cherish in our judges.
D.

Insulation From CountermajoritarianPressures

The importance of the courts in developing and defining
constitutional rights has given rise to a belief that judges can
only perform those functions, or can only perform them at optimal levels, if they are insulated from popular accountability.
Thus, it is argued that the constitutional grants of life tenure
and freedom from salary impairment constitute an institutional
benchmark which distinguishes the federal judiciary from its
largely popularly elected state brethren.' 9
One might intuitively suspect that between two classes of
47. K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 68 (1973).
48. If federal judges are so insulated, it is highly suspect that this factor would put
them in a better position to pass upon constitutional topics. Even the Platonic Guardians, who possessed all wisdom, did not act in ignorance of the practical consequences of
their decisions. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC AND OTHER WORKS 117-18 (B. Jowett trans. 1973).
49. Neuborne, supra note 16, at 1127.
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individuals-one class protected from accountability, the other
class subject to it-the class insulated from accountability will
function with a greater degree of freedom than the accountable
class. Yet, it cannot be argued that nonaccountability a fortiori
equals competency. As observed earlier, when applying intuitive
concepts to the judicial decisionmaking process, generalizations
are fraught with difficulty. It has not been proven that state
courts are so less competently staffed than federal courts as to
warrant a general finding of federal institutional superiority. 0
That positions on state courts do not carry the "prestige" associated with positions on the federal courts is true; however, this
does not necessarily undermine the vitality of state courts as
competent decisionmaking tribunals. Indeed, if one reflects upon
the historic function of state courts as expositors of political and
social rights, one sees little support for the theory of federal
superiority."
Although the point was raised in a somewhat different context, striking support for the argument of basic institutional
equivalency was noted by Professor Hans Linde. 2 Professor
Linde observed that decisions which are characterized as "undemocratic" when performed by federal courts are routinely
made by state courts. 53 Similarly, in many cases state courts ad50. See notes 28-40 and accompanying text supra.
51. See notes 57-58 and accompanying text infra. Especially in the era prior to the
Civil Rights Cases of 1883, the state courts were thought the dominant guarantors of
individual civil liberties, such as free speech. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). In that case, the Court
recognized that the federal government had to guarantee certain rights in order to prevent state action from infringing on those rights. The Court recognized, however, that the
fourteenth amendment
does not authorize Congress to create a code of municipal law for the regulation of private rights; but to provide modes of redress against the operation of
state laws, and the action of state officers . . . when these are subversive of
the fundamental rights specified in the amendment.
Id. at 11. See generally Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833);
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). In Barron, the Chief Justice Marshall wrote: "In almost every convention by which the constitution was adopted, amendments to guard against the abuse of power were recommended. These amendments demanded security against the apprehended encroachments of the general government-not
against those of the local government." 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 249.
52. Linde, Judges, Critics nd the Realist Tradition, 82 YALE L.J. 227 (1972).
53. A wider view of the constitutional system would, for example, place in perspective the traditional agonizing over the "undemocratic" character of judicial power and the Supreme Court's supposedly anomalous role in the national political structure. Throughout the states it is taken for granted that
large areas of lawmaking are left to the courts. When a state court alters the
law of products liability, abolishes sovereign or charitable tort immunity, redefines the insanity defense, or restricts the range of self-exculpation in con-
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dress a variety of political issues because they do not rely on access-constraining doctrines such as justiciability to avoid a judicial determination on the merits." Moreover, issues are no less
important nor is the potential for controversy any less significant
simply because the issues are raised in a state court rather than
a federal court.55
Professor Linde's observations point to the conscientious attempts by state courts to exercise the judicial function in a manner consistent with historical processes and social needs and
should put to rest the notion that state courts are slaves to
majoritarian pressures. In practice, both state and federal courts
are countermajoritarian, although this does not imply that either
system of courts is inconsistent with democratic governance. 6
tracts of adhesion, its action is rarely attacked as "undemocratic." Nor is this
judicial role peculiar to matters of common law subject to legislative reversal.

The accepted dominance of courts in state law extends to their "antimajoritarian" role in review of their coordinate political branches in state and
local governments. Yet neither judges nor critics seem concerned that state
courts should fear for their own institutional survival. Nor is it seriously argued that the accepted judicial dominance in the state is legitimated by the
fact that, unlike the federal judiciary, state judges are subject to periodic
election.
Id. at 248 (footnote omitted).
54. [Tlhere are hardly any state analogues to the self-imposed constraints on
justiciability, "political questions," and the like that occupy students of the
Supreme Court. State courts settle contests over public offices, pass on the
propriety of proposed public expenditures and even of proposed constitutional
amendments, often at the suit of mere "taxpayers." The "legalitarian" urge
toward judicialization that Professor Bickel deplores seems to have been
taken for granted at the state level long before the Warren Court as a desired
safeguard against slipshod government.
Id. (footnote omitted).
55. Nor do the holdings of state courts simply deal with less important or less
controversial matters than those of the Supreme Court. In half the states, for
instance, judges were enforcing the exclusion of illegally seized evidence
before the Supreme Court imposed it on the other half. State courts were
deep in controversy over the position of religion in education long before it
became a federal issue; some have remained so since. In California, the Supreme Court anticipated federal constitutional protection for racially mixed
marriages by nineteen years, invalidated the most bitterly debated popular
initiative of modern times, began a revolution in the historic assumptions of
local school financing, and decreed an end to the death penalty which for
decades had been a subject of political debate. And on the original battleground of the revolt against judicial supremacy-the bold reversals of "unreasonable" legislative regulation of economic affairs-many state courts have
simply refused to follow the Supreme Court's withdrawal of review of this
area.
Id. at 248-49 (footnote omitted).
56. Professor Currie's wise admonition comes to mind: "There is much in our Constitution that protects against what Mill called the 'tyranny of the majority'; perhaps
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With the similarity of protections afforded in many state
constitutions to those found in the Bill of Rights,57 state courts
can be expected to be competent, experienced and knowledgeable in the areas of law, and sensitive to the problems, that arise
in the adjudication of close constitutional questions. Acceptance
of any argument challenging the competency of state courts to
follow the Constitution necessarily calls into question the willingness and ability of state courts to follow their own organic,
fundamental law. There is no evidence that state courts have
proved unequal to the task.
The argument of those who believe that state courts will fail
to give adequate and satisfactory protection to federal interests
and individual rights appears based on aberrational state court
pronouncements rather than on the norm of state court decisions. Acceptance of that argument would logically lead to a policy designed to replace state enforcement and protection of constitutional rights with federal enforcement and protection
whenever possible. That policy would, in turn, represent an unsupported interference with the principle of federalism. Moreover, many of the ringing Supreme Court decisions of the 1960's
to which one naturally turns for an example of the inability of
state courts to protect contitutional claims or federal interests,
simply do not provide the desired support. Constitutional theory
that escaped the Supreme Court for over one hundred years can
hardly be held up to demonstrate generalized state hostility or
incompetency to handle such claims. A period of great Supreme
Court activity that serves as the harbinger of totally new doctrines-and of the consequent redrawing of federal-state relationships-must be expected to arise, like the phoenix, out of the
ashes of state (and federal) practices that are seen as improper
only in retrospect. Once the new doctrine emerges and is sufficiently refined so that its permanence and contours can be objudicial review is undemocratic in the complimentary sense, as is the Bill of Rights." D.
CURRIE, FEDERAL COURTS, CASES AND MATERIALS 34 (2d ed. 1975). For a valuable discussion of the relationship between judicial review and democratic governance, see Bishin,
Judicial Review in Democratic Theory, 50 S. CAL. L. REv. 1099 (1977).
57. See, e.g., California Declaration of Rights, CAL. CONST. art. I; Florida Declaration of Rights, FLA. CONST. art. I; Virginia Bill of Rights, VA. CONST. art. I.
58. Indeed, as Professor Linde has observed, in many respects state courts had independently proceeded to develop many of the constitutional provisions that are often erroneously believed to have originated in the Warren Court, such as guaranteeing the separation of religion from public schools and protecting racially mixed marriages. Indeed, in
many respects the Warren Court was more of a follower than a leader. See Linde, supra
note 52, at 249 nn. 70-72.
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served, however, state court implementation can be expected.
Excepting the aberrational case, state courts have met these
expectations.5"
III.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMITMENT OF THE POWER TO

ALLOCATE JURISDICTION OVER MATrERS IMPLICATING FEDERAL
INTERESTS

The resolution of all state-federal forum allocation questions
begins with article III, section I, of the Constitution of the
United States, which provides that "the judicial power of the
United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in
such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." 0 Although the provision is not free from
ambiguity, the accepted view is that the Constitution vests in
Congress the power to determine when and, most important for
our purposes, how federal judicial power is to be allocated."'
In implementing its constitutional authority, Congress is
generally deemed to have intended that state and federal courts
have concurrent jurisdiction to adjudicate federal matters unless
clear and convincing evidence to the contrary exists.2 This fol59. See generally Brennan, supra note 25.
60. U.S. CONST. art. Il, § 1.
61. That the power to create includes the power to control and limit is quite universally accepted. See Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 400-01 (1973). See generally
HART & WECHSLER, supra note 13, at 844-47.
62. See Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820).
Speaking upon the subject of the federal judiciary, the Federalist distinctly asserts the doctrine, that the United States, in the course of legislation
upon the objects entrusted to their direction, may commit the decision of
causes arising upon a particular regulation to the federal Courts solely, if it
should be deemed expedient; yet that in every case, in which the State tribunals should not be expressly excluded by the acts of the national legislature,
they would, of course, take cognizance of the causes to which those acts might
give birth.
I can discover, I confess, nothing unreasonable in this doctrine; nor can I
perceive any inconvenience which can grow out of it, so long as the power of
Congress to withdraw the whole, or any part of those cases, from the jurisdiction of the State Courts, is, as I think it must be, admitted.
The practice of the general government seems strongly to confirm this
doctrine; for at the first session of Congress which commenced after the adoption of the constitution, the judicial system was formed; and the exclusive
and concurrent jurisdiction conferred upon the Courts created by that law,
were clearly distinguished and marked; showing that, in the opinion of that
body, it was not sufficient to vest an exclusive jurisdiction, where it was
deemed proper, merely by a grant of jurisdiction generally.
Id. at 25-26 (footnote omitted). See generally Note, Exclusive Jurisdictionof the Federal
Courts in Pri.vate Civil Actions, 70 HARV. L. REV. 509 (1957).
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lows from article III of the Constitution and has been reflected in
our legal history. As noted by the Court in Charles Dowd Box
3

Co. v. Courtney:1

Concurrent jurisdiction has been a common phenomenon
in our judicial history, and exclusive federal court jurisdiction
over cases arising under federal law has been the exception
rather than the rule. This court's approach . . . has been to

affirm the state court's jurisdiction, where it is not excluded
by express provision, or by incompatibility in its exercise arising from the nature of the particular case."
Thus, the Constitution created a federal judicial power and
vested in Congress the power to allocate and restrict that jurisdiction. Since Congress has not limited federal subject matter
jurisdiction to federal courts, the inescapable conclusion is that
state courts may decide questions of federal law. Indeed, there
seems to be little doubt about the validity of the above statement, 5 and the point is conceded by the proponents of federal
institutional superiority. What is disputed is the question of
how much credit a federal court must give to a congressional expression of concurrent jurisdiction. A proponent of federal superiority would argue that, because of the institutional infirmities
of state courts as compared to federal courts, a federal court
need not interpret the establishment of concurrent jurisdiction
as warranting federal deferral to state court adjudication. 7 On
the other hand, the Supreme Court has consistently proceeded
on the assumption that state and federal courts are interchangeable fora, likely to provide equivalent protection for federally
guaranteed rights.6" Accordingly, deferral or avoidance of the
63. 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
64. Id. at 507-08. The benefit of vesting the federal judicial power in both state and
federal courts is that the equilibrium of a federal system is retained by not imparting
centripetal power to the national court system. See also THE FEDERALIST No. 82 (A.
Hamilton).
65. Although in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 337 (1816), the
Court suggested that state courts were incapable of entertaining federal causes of action,
that suggestion has never received any acceptance by the Court and might have found
expression for ulterior motives. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 13, at 314 (suggesting
that the statement was designed to prod Congress to increase the original jurisdiction of

the inferior federal courts). Indeed, the Court has expressly affirmed the power of state
courts to entertain federal causes of action. Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136 (1876)
("[Tlhe state court has jurisdiction where it is not excluded by express provision, or by
incompatibility in its exercise arising from the nature of the particular case.").
66. Neuborne, supra note 16.
67. Id. passim.
68. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493-94 n.35 (1976).
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case and the consequent resolution of the dispute in state court
will not necessarily impinge upon federally guaranteed rights of
the petitioner.
Both positions are flawed for different reasons. The arguments of the proponents of federal superiority miss the mark:
although it is correct to question the deferral and avoidance
practices established by the Supreme Court in the areas of federal law open to concurrent jurisdiction, 9 the argument of federal institutional superiority fails to address the primary question whether the judiciary can properly reformulate a
congressional forum allocation decision. Similarly, recent statements by the Supreme Court in Stone v. Powell express the
belief that on an institutional basis, forum interchangeability exists but those statements fail to address the question whether
such a finding warrants either deferral or avoidance of the case.
In essence, while the Court's assumptions in Powell regarding institutional parity between state and federal courts in adjudicating constitution claims 7 are largely correct as abstractions, it is
improper to use those assumptions in concrete cases without first
determining whether the assumptions retain validity in the face
of a congressionally created model of rights and remedies.
Thus, both arguments regarding institutional parity fail to
give adequate consideration to the nexus between the issue of
institutional competency and the question of the relationship
which should exist between the judiciary and the Congress. Nor,
for that matter, does either argument adequately deal with the
role the federal courts ought to maintain. Consequently, they fail
to define accurately the proper attitude with which a federal
court should address a forum allocation question.
A.

The Constitutional Scheme

The framers of the Constitution envisioned a basic relationship between state and federal courts wherein the state courts
would be the primary tribunals for the protection of constitu69. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). Jurisdiction to consider claims brought pursuant to id. § 1983 is concurrent. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976); Ammlung v. City
of Chester, 355 F. Supp. 1300 (E.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd, 494 F.2d 811 (3d Cir. 1974); Brown
v. Pitchess, 15 Cal. 3d 518, 531 P.2d 772, 119 Cal. Rptr. 204 (1975); Holt v. City of Troy,
78 Misc. 2d 9, 355 N.Y.S.2d 94 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
70. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
71. The Court assumed state judges are as capable of applying the fourth amendment as are federal judges because both handle such claims on a daily basis. Id. at 493-94
& n.35.
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tional rights. This point was clearly made by Professor Hart in
his famous Dialectic.72 Indeed, even those who disagree with the
"full power" theory of congressional control over the jurisdiction
of the federal courts concede the correctness of Hart's interpretation of the framers' intent."3
Consequently, literal interpretation of the Constitution and
unqualified acceptance of the framers' intent would suggest that
the assumption made in Stone v. Powe1174-that state and federal courts are interchangeable and likely to provide equivalent
protection of federal constitutional rights-is at least consistent
with the constitutional scheme. Indeed, inasmuch as the framers
contemplated that state courts, rather than federal courts, would
function as the primary guarantors of constitutional protections,
the need for the assumption of institutional equivalency dissipates. Absent a congressional grant of access to federal courts,
the federal judicial power is exercisable by the states. Therefore,
one must necessarily conclude that the constitutional scheme assumes that state courts will be generally faithful to their constitutional responsibilities; indeed, any other construction would be
disingenuous. Yet, should state courts prove unfaithful or unequal to the task, the framers provided Congress a retained power
under article III to reestablish the desired equilibrium of
federalism.
Nonetheless, the argument is advanced on occasion that the
mere fact that Congress has consistently expanded access to federal courts necessarily undermines the constitutional assump72. See Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdictionof Federal Courts: An
Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARv. L. REv. 1362 (1953):
In the scheme of the Constitution, [the state courts] are the primary guarantors of Constitutional rights, and in many cases they may be the ultimate
ones. If they were to fail, and if Congress had taken away the Supreme
Court's appellate jurisdiction and been upheld in doing so, then we really

would be sunk.
Q. But Congress can regulate the jurisdiction of state courts, too, in
federal matters.
A. Congress can't do it unconstitutionally. The state courts always have
a general jurisdiction to fall back on. And the Supremacy Clause binds them
to exercise that jurisdiction in accordance with the Constitution.
Id. at 1401 (footnote omitted).
73. For example, Professor Redish, who challenged the utility of the traditional interpretation for current application, see Redish & Woods, supra note 13, at 45, concedes
the validity of the traditional interpretation itself insofar as it reflects the probable intent
of the framers. Redish & Muench, Adjudication of Federal Causes of Action in State
Court, 75 MICH. L. Rzv. 311, 314 (1976).
74. 428 U.S. 465 (1975).
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tion.7 5 It is important to note that the argument proceeds from
the mere fact of congressional action; the argument does not attempt to discern congressional intentions in the matter with respect to specific statutory schemes. 6
The argument correctly identifies a prime concern: the potential treatment in state court of federal interests. It fails, however, to establish a link between the perceived need to provide
access to a federal forum via express congressional legislation in
certain situations and the perception that the judiciary can
properly identify those situations and provide such access, either
independently or in derogation of congressional intent.
The examples used by Professor Neuborne in his critique of
the notion of institutional equivalency-the fugitive slave legislation and the post-Civil War reconstruction legislation-illustrate the point. Professor Neuborne asserts that these
congressional acts clearly evidence a congressional perception of
federal institutional superiority. To an extent, Professor
Neuborne's argument is correct. The fugitive slave legislation
and the post-Civil War reconstruction legislation were indeed
conceived and implemented by Congress because of the hostility
of state fora to the adjudication of certain defined federal interests. The Fugitive Slave Act of 185071 was in direct response to
attempts by several northern states to close their courts to slaveholders,78 certainly a course of suspect constitutionality.7" The
post-Civil War legislation creating access to the federal courts
was almost entirely directed at securing for "Negroes [their]
newly granted civil rights." 0 The possibility that the recently
freed slaves would receive equal justice before the state courts of
the Confederacy was so obviously nonexistent that creation of a
federal forum was absolutely necessary.8" On the other hand, the
1875 Judiciary Act, 2 which created general federal question ju75. See, e.g., Neuborne, supra note 16.
76. Id. passim.
77. Act of Sept. 18, 1850, ch. 10, 9 Stat. 362.
78. Neuborne, supra note 16, at 1113.
79. See Testa v,Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947) (where a state court would entertain same
type of claim as created by federal statutory scheme, it may not deny enforcement to the
federal law in its own courts).
80. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 13, at 846.
81. 6 FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, REcONSTRUCTION & REUNION 1864-68 (part 1, 1971) passim.
82. Act of Mar. 3, 1875 ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470. Prior to 1867, the notion that state
courts would correctly adjudicate federal interests was so pervasive that even with respect to writs of habeas corpus Congress relied upon state courts in most instances. The
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risdiction, passed "almost unnoticed inside or outside the halls
of Congress. 8'

3

The circumstances under which that Act was

passed hardly indicate a belief that a federal forum was essential
to adjudicate federal questions because of a widespread perception of state court inferiority.84
These examples of congressional action, rather than supporting a charge of general institutional disparity, indicate, if
anything, a generally purposeful congressional response to specific, demonstrated needs in limited situations with the purpose
of providing a forum that would serve as a counterbalance to a
hostile state forum. Where Congress legislated broadly (as it did
with general federal question jurisdiction), it did not do so on the
basis of a perceived general institutional disparity between state
and federal fora. One would strain the historical context by arguing that specific instances of perceived or actual state court bias
or prejudice mandate an across-the-board assumption of the lack
of institutional equivalency. A specific congressional response to
a particular problem simply does not support a broadly based
thesis attacking (or, for that matter, defending) the concept of
institutional equivalence of state and federal courts.
An analysis of general congressional practices attendant to
the creation of federal remedial. or regulatory schemes demonstrates a consistent congressional attitude which appears to be
completely at odds with any suggestion that Congress views state
courts as necessarily less competent institutions than federal
courts. The practice of Congress is to vest state and federal
courts with concurrent jurisdiction over federal matters so as to
expand the number of fora available for the enforcement and
protection of federal rights, not to divest state courts of existing
jurisdiction."5 It is difficult to rationalize such practices if Congress is at the same time supposed to be stating that state courts
original grant to the federal courts to issue writs of habeas corpus was accompanied by a
limiting provision allowing the writ to issue generally only where the custody was by
authority of the United States. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20., 1 Stat. 73, 81-82. The
expansion of habeas relief, coupled with interference with state authorities, only really

began with the Force Act of 1833, ch. 57, § 7, 4 Stat. 634, which resulted from the nullification movement in South Carolina. See Dobie, Habeas Corpus in the Federal Courts, 13
VA. L. R~v. 433, 442 (1927).
83. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 13, at 846-47.
84. It has been argued that the increase in federal court caseloads subsequent to the
1875 Act was largely due to the desire of litigants not to litigate actions involving federally chartered railroads before inhospitable state fora. Id. See generally Pacific Removal
R.R. Cases, 115 U.S. 1 (1885).
85. See Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
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are inferior tribunals for the adjudication of federal interests.
Yet, the above characterization of congressional power
might suggest an inconsistency. Once Congress has resolved that
in certain instances a new cause of action needs effectuation in
federal courts, it might be thought inconsistent for Congress also
to provide, by the vesting of concurrent jurisdiction, that the
federal interest will find adequate protection in state courts. If
state courts are supposed to be adequate, why is it also necessary
to provide access to a federal forum? While the inconsistency appears provocative, it is more apparent than real and can be reconciled in several ways.
First, since the basic decision whether to create a federal
right which will displace state law is essentially a political question in the hands of Congress, then deciding where to litigate
federal interests cannot be any less a political question; thus,
that matter is also committed to Congress."5 The latter naturally
and inevitably follows from the former. And because the forum
allocation decision is largely a political decision, the creation of
concurrent jurisdiction might simply represent a political compromise which will assist the passage of the remedial or regulatory scheme; it might constitute a thoughtless decision by a Congress accustomed to the vicissitudes of inertia, or it might be
even more basic and profound. It may, as Professor Hart once
observed, be reflective of "[clommon sense and the instinct for
freedom alike [which] can be counted upon to tell the American
people never to put all their eggs of hope from governmental
problem-solving in one governmental basket."87
Second, congressional creation of concurrent jurisdiction
might more profitably be viewed as a congressional statement
86. See generally Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism; The Role of the
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REv.
543 (1954); see also Note, supra note 62, at 509-10 (1957).
When Congress creates a new cause of action it must determine the extent to which the remedy provided will be available in the federal courts. The
possible alternatives are to vest the federal and state courts with concurrent
jurisdiction, or to confer exclusive jurisdiction on either system. Congress has
generally chosen to grant concurrent jurisdiction and, if the statute contains
no express provision to the contrary, such a grant may be presumed. However, exclusive jurisdiction has been given to the federal courts in several major areas. ...
The purpose of the Note is to consider the factors relevant to a legislative
choice between concurrent and exclusive jurisdiction.
(footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
87. Hart, The Relation Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 489, 540
(1954).
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that uniformity in the creation and application of federal law is
less important than is making available to American citizens the
most sympathetic forum they can find to seek redress for
claimed infringements of their federal rights. In essence, creation
of concurrent jurisdiction could support a finding that Congress
desired that litigants be allowed to forum shop between state
and federal courts. Such a finding would not be illogical. Congress could certainly have intended for federal litigation to be
brought in the most sympathetic forum, and concurrent jurisdiction would allow forum shoppers to correct for local variations
between state and federal judiciaries. 8
B.

The Ascertainment of CongressionalIntent to Displace
State Fora

The preceding analysis suggests two general themes. First,
congressional enactment of concurrent jurisdiction, without
more, expresses congressional neutrality on the question of institutional competence of particular courts to adjudicate federal interests, rather than reflecting a definite preference. Second, there
is no constitutional provision prohibiting Congress from expressing a preference or allowing a litigant to express a preference for
one forum (state or federal) over the other. These two concepts
delineate the problem of forum allocation faced by federal
courts. Simply put, it is not the business of federal courts to
make basic decisions regarding where federal rights are to be ad-.
judicated; it is the business of federal courts to determine
whether Congress has made a forum allocation decision and, if
so, what the forum allocation decision is and whether it exceeds
the power granted to Congress by the Constitution. Having made
those determinations, a federal court is not justified in further
considering the propriety of a congressional forum allocation
decision.
The concept of congressional neutrality on the question of
competency follows from the basic presumption of concurrent jurisdiction. As discussed earlier, the basic constitutional scheme
provides that any forum allocation decision made by Congress
would be oriented towards the creation of concurrent jurisdiction.89 Consistent with this view is the basic principle developed
88. See Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 Hnav. L. Rlv.
1133, 1285 (1977).
89. See text accompanying notes 49-72 supra.
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in Claffin v. Houseman,"0 under which the judiciary presumes
concurrent jurisdiction from congressional silence unless the
Congress "expressly or by fair implication" creates exclusive jurisdiction." The federal courts, however, as often as not have
failed to follow this presumption of concurrent jurisdiction, either by ignoring the Claflin principle altogether or by giving an
expansive interpretation to the "fair implication" exception.,'
Unfortunately, the courts have failed to be explicit when describing the circumstances under which the Claflin principle will not
be followed or when describing other tests as alternatives to the
Claflin presumption. 3
Several solutions to the problem of determining whether
Congress intended to create exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction
have been suggested. Under one approach, the judiciary seeks to
ascertain congressional intent by examining legislative history.
Under a second approach, the judiciary eschews reliance upon
legislative history in favor of an "ad hoc" analysis of the practical needs of the federal system. The legislative history test is
simply an alternative for ascertaining legislative intent. Referring a court to an undefined search for legislative intent or purpose, of course, leaves the court with a great degree of leeway
because as the argument goes, "legislative intent" is a myth. 5
There are no external constraints on the purposes ascribed to the
legislature by a court. On the other hand, it has been contended
that legislatures do have a goal or purpose when they enact a
statute. That purpose, it is argued, is what is actually meant by
the term "legislative intent," and one can utilize various tools,
including the legislative history of a statute, to discern what the
goal or purpose was."
Legislators certainly have an "intent" when they enact a
statute. Whether the intent is meaningful or capable of assessment, however, is another matter. Nevertheless, given our common law tradition and the general terms which accompany many
pieces of legislation,"7 the judicial search for legislative intent is
90. 93 U.S. 130, 136-37 (1876).
91. See generally Redish & Muench, supra note 73, at 313-14.
92. Id. at 316.
93. Id. at 316-22.
94. See text accompanying notes 81-83 infra.
95. See Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REv. 863 (1930).
96. See Landis, A Note on "Statutory Interpretation," 43 H~av. L. REv. 886 (1930).
97. Also not to be ignored is the problem of draftsmanship. See Raymond, Legal
Writing: An Obstruction to Justice, 30 ALA. L. REv. 1 (1978).
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not likely to be disregarded as a tool for statutory interpretation.
The variety of controversies which call upon the courts to apply
a statute preclude any realistic expectation that courts could
avoid some analysis of the leeways of the statute to ascertain its
applicability. In any event, to the extent that agreement of some
sort can be obtained that a definable legislative intent exists,
there is only a grey area between statutory interpretation and
judicial innovation. "Statutory interpretation shades into judicial lawmaking on a spectrum, as specific evidence of legislative
advertence to the issue at hand attenuates." s The development
of effective standards for interpreting the legislative history of
congressional forum allocation decisions would minimize the
chances of judicial deviation from actual "legislative intent."
The second approach, based on the practical needs of the
federal system," suffers in that it encourages the courts to intrude upon matters not properly within their province. The mere
absence of congressional expression of its opinion on a matter
within its purview does not authorize the courts to make a decision in that field. On the other hand, the "practical needs" test
does present a utilitarian method for resolving controversies involving overbroad congressional delegations of jurisdictional decisions. For example, the Supreme Court's treatment of general
federal question jurisdiction under section 1331 of title 28 of the
United States Code as narrower than its appellate jurisdiction
under article III, section 2, is no doubt reflective of this "practical needs" argument.'"
98. HA'irr & WECHSLER, supra note 13, at 770.
99. Redish & Muench, supra note 73, at 329.
100. See Mishkin, The Federal Question in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REv.
157 (1953):
In any event, it should be clear that while the power of Congress must of
necessity extend to an extremely wide range of cases, the actual assignment
of all such suits to the national courts might well prove unwise and selfdefeating.
...But to include such suits within the language of the general federal
question statute would involve the national courts in all the litigation sur-

rounding the ownership of other property of which the United States is only
too happy finally to be rid. The price of symmetry would then be an overloading of the federal courts with a concomitant loss in their performance of more
significant tasks. If Congress, in full awareness of the situation, had unequivocally called for such a result, then it would be the duty of the courts to obey.
But, short of that, only blind subservience to form would choose such a course
when confronted (as Congress was not) with the consequences it would entail.
The only feasible solution, therefore, is to vary the treatment of the phrase
"arising under" depending on the instrument in which it.appears.
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While the "practical needs" test cannot be ignored, it would
be a mistake to treat it as an independent standard in this area.
Rather, the proper role of a "practical needs" test can only be
ascertained by identifying the needs of a federal system.' But,
because the central, unresolved problem lies in developing a consistent and predictable methodology for making forum allocation
decisions, identifying the "decisionmaker" becomes as important
as identifying the needs. The determination of where conflicts
are to be resolved could have a profound impact upon the ultimate resolution of the conflict; however, to note that different
results might arise as a result of allocating decisionmaking responsibility between state and federal courts only begins the inquiry. A much more fundamental inquiry remains: In a nation
fundamentally committed to rule by law, where does the basic
authority to allocate the federal judicial power reside? As that
authority is committed to one branch of government, the Congress, there is little to recommend in judicial decisions that treat
the forum allocation issue as wide open to plenary judicial
evaluation.
A sound approach for the proper resolution of state-federal
forum allocation issues would retain responsibility and impose

Thus, whenever in the course of litigation in any tribunal the determination of a federal issue becomes crucial, it must be possible for the United
States Supreme Court to have the final say; the "arising under" clause of the
Constitution must, therefore, be broad enough to comprehend such cases. But
to require their inclusion within the same phrase of the statute conferring
original federal jurisdiction merely because the terminology is the same,
would be to allow form to eclipse problems of substance.
Id. at 159-60, 162-63 (footnote omitted).
101. Professor Hart saw the problem clearly:
The question obviously cuts deep into basic issues of how governments
ought to function and how they can best function. If one conceives of the job
of governing as a job of affirmative direction of social affairs, with responsibility, in Professor Fuller's expressive phrase, of "planning for determinate
ends," then a federal organization will necessarily appear inefficient. To make
a large-scale organization manageable there must be decentralization in any
case, but the guiding geniuses of a central command would naturally prefer to
have the lines of authority run straight from them to the remotest of their
delegates. If, on the other hand, one thinks of private activity as the prime
motive power of social life, the test of efficiency is different. The job of government appears then as a job of providing a favorable framework for collaborative living-as a job, in other words, of planning for such "indeterminate
ends" as establishing justice, insuring domestic tranquility, providing for the
common defense, promoting the general welfare, and securing the blessings of
liberty to the members of the society and their posterity.
Hart, supra note 87, at 490 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
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accountability where the Constitution places it-with Congress.
Thus, judicial assessment of congressional intentions ought to be
based upon the clearest expressions of congressional intent possible. Where the court is unable to discern clear evidence of congressional intent, it should resolve the allocation question in
favor of concurrent jurisdiction, premised upon a constitutional
assumption of institutional equivalency.
The suggested approach would ameloriate several problems
with the Claflin presumption. First, by requiring clear evidence
of congressional intent, courts would avoid needless speculation
into congressional designs. Were federal courts inclined to use a
more constrained approach to forum allocation decisions, the resultant consistency and return to constitutional conformity
would be meaningful and beneficial. Judicial insistence that
Congress make clear forum allocation decisions would put responsibility and accountability where the Constitution places
it-with Congress. Judicial interpretation of intent would then
be necessary only in those cases where Congress has not specifically defined the basis for forum allocation. In such cases, a
stricter Claflin presumption would require a finding of concurrent jurisdiction when clear evidence was lacking, because concurrent jurisdiction is the one interpretation of congressional
failure to speak, or speak clearly, which is most consistent with
the Constitution and with the entire panoply of congressional
legislation. 02 Thus, the clear evidence test would enable a court
to identify what ought to be the proper perspective in ascertaining how Congress intended the forum allocation to be made.
Second, by abrogating the "fair implication" test, the "clear
evidence" approach would avoid needless inconsistencies in the
formation of legal doctrine. In other words, having created by
judicial fiat an exception (exclusive jurisdiction) so as to avoid
an otherwise utilitarian presumption (concurrent jurisdiction),
the federal courts are in turn forced to extend that exception at
the expense of other principles. For example, while exclusive federal jurisdiction of federal antitrust actions was implied from the
102. Recently, the Court has moved toward requiring Congress to state clearly its
purposes in enacting legislation by refusing to construe statutory language in such ways
as to ameliorate the stricture of a particular application of the statute to a particular
case. See, e.g., Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (Endangered Species
Act of 1978 required injunction prohibiting completion of a dam that would have destroyed habitat of endangered species even though the dam was virtually complete and
Congress had appropriated large sums of public money after appropriation committees
were apprised of the impact of the dam upon the endangered species).
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1 such jurisdiction did not preempt state
need for uniformity, 03
courts from hearing defenses predicated on the Sherman Act.'04
Although a state court determination of such a defense is statutorily entitled to full faith and credit in the federal courts, 105 it
was held in Lyons v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.'"' that a state
court defendant was not estopped from relitigating the antitrust
question in federal court because that forum's exclusive jurisdiction "should be taken to imply an immunity of their decisions
from any prejudgment elsewhere."' 07 Hence, the goal of uniformity was only achieved through questionable limitations on the
doctrine of collateral estoppel and the credit due state
judgments.
Unfortunately, if the goal is uniformity, the approach of the
Court is counterintuitive. If the rationale for implying exclusive
jurisdiction is uniformity in the creation, interpretation and application of federal law, 08 the same rationale suggests the need
for federal preemption. Yet, while the Court has found exclusive
federal jurisdiction by "fair implication," it has not allowed federal preemption to develop in a like manner. Rather, the Court
has required "clear evidence" that Congress sought to exclude
the field from state control. 09 Because this disparity in tests al-

103. See Redish & Muench, supra note 73, at 316 n.26.
104. See, e.g., City Trade & Indus. Ltd. v. New Cent. Jute Mills Co., 25 N.Y.2d 49,
56, 250 N.E.2d 52, 56, 302 N.Y.S.2d 557, 562-63 (1969). See generally Note, supra note
62, at 509-11.
105. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1970). The statute provides that a state judicial proceeding
shall have the same full faith and credit in federal courts as in the rendering state court.
The statute was designed to cause state judgments functionally to run to federal courts in
the same manner and to the same extent as state judgments were given faith and credit
in other states under the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art.
IV, § 1. See Degnan, Federalized Res Judicata, 85 YALE L.J. 741, 743-44 (1976). Yet, the
judicial treatment of the statute has been inconsistent, and this inconsistency has largely
developed from the Supreme Court's failure to achieve coherence in its development of
forum allocation principles. See, e.g., Comment, Collateral Estoppel Effect of State
Court Judgment in Federal Antitrust Suits, 51 CALIF. L. Rxv. 955 (1963); Note, Res Judicata: Exclusive FederalJurisdictionand the Effect of Prior State-Court Determinations,
53 VA. L. REv. 1360 (1967). See generally Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and
Federalism, supra note 88, at 1331-37.
106. 222 F.2d 184 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 825 (1955).
107. Id. at 189. Thus, the finding of exclusive jurisdiction for treble damage actions
under the federal antitrust laws, itself questionable, see Redish & Muench, supra note 73,
at 316-17, led in turn to an extension of federal jurisdiction by a dubious avoidance of 28
U.S.C. § 1738 in Lyons.
108. See Note, supra note 62, at 511-14.
109. The doctrine of federal preemption of state authority has its origin in the
"supremacy clause" of the Constitution, which declares that: 'This Constitution, and
the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof. . . shall be the
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lows state courts to continue determining federal defenses in the
Lyons grey area between exclusive jurisdiction and preemption,
the goal of uniformity can be reached only by wholesale revision
of numerous interconnected doctrines, such as preclusion by
judgment, without any showing that the creature constructed by
the courts resembles the congressional original.
The determination that Congress has provided a scheme for
concurrent jurisdiction does not end the inquiry. It must still be
ascertained whether Congress intended that any system of preferences exist with respect to forum allocation between state and
federal courts. The mere fact that Congress has vested concurrent jurisdiction in both state and federal courts is not dispositive of the question of whether the litigant must receive a hearing in the federal forum he selects. Congressional intent or the
purposes sought to be achieved, as gleaned from the statutory
scheme, could substantially impact upon the forum allocation
decision.
supreme Law of the Land .... any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
When a state's exercise of its police power is challenged under the supremacy clause,
a federal court begins "with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States
were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress." Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947), quoted
in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157 (1978).
Express preemption occurs when Congress has stated expressly either in a federal
statute or in the legislative history pertaining thereto that federal regulation was intended to be exclusive. See, e.g., Railway Employees' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225
(1956); Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 501-02 (1956); Schwabacher v. United
States, 334 U.S. 182, 197 (1948).
Federal preemption may also be found by implication:
Such a [congressional] purpose may be evidenced in several ways. The
scheme of federal regulation may be so pervasive as to make reasonable the
inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it. Or the
Act of Congress may touch a field in which the federal interest is so dominant
that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws
on the same subject. Likewise, the object sought to be obtained by the federal
law and the character of obligations imposed by it may reveal the same
purpose.
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. at 230 (citations omitted).
Finally, even if Congress has not completely foreclosed state legislation in a particular area, a state statute is void to the extent that it actually conflicts with a valid federal
statute. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 158 (1978). A conflict in this sense
may be found in at least two types of circumstances. First, conflict preemption will occur
"where compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility."
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963). Second, a
conflict will be found where the state "law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
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The point was demonstrated in Monroe v. Pape,"0 in which
an action was brought in federal court pursuant to its concurrent
jurisdiction over civil rights suits under section 1983 of title 42 of
the United States Code."' Writing for the Court in Monroe, Mr.
Justice Douglas discerned from the legislative history of section
1983 three purposes underlying its enactment: (1) to override
discriminatory state laws; (2) to provide a federal remedy where
the state remedy was inadequate; and (3) to provide a federal
remedy where the state remedy, although adequate in theory,
was not available in practice."'
Had the Court stopped at this point, some justification for
the use of deferral doctrines, such as abstention, in section 1983
cases might be justified; the above-categorized statutory policies
would not mandate the exercise of federal jurisdiction in every
case of alleged discriminatory conduct, but only under those circumstances where the state remedy is inadequate. Thus, caseby-case determinations requiring the federal plaintiff to demonstrate the inadequacy of a state remedy would be consistent with
the congressional plan. The majority, however, went beyond the
above three purposes and discerned a modern purpose to provide
a supplemental federal remedy."'
Although the judicial discovery of this modern purpose was
associated with the problem of exhaustion of state remedies, it
has manifest impact upon the forum allocation question. If Congress intended that a federal plaintiff could seek the "supplemental" federal remedy before invoking state remedies, then
Congress must have intended that its jurisdictional grant to federal courts be respected. It seems anomalous, however, for the
federal courts to find a supplementary federal remedy independent of the inadequacy of state remedies and yet disregard congressional desires by directing the federal plaintiff to forego his
federal remedy for a state remedy pursuant to forum allocation
110. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
111. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities, secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
112. 365 U.S. at 173.74.

113. "The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need
not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked." Id. at 183.
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doctrines such as the abstention or the Younger doctrines."'
Where Congress has created a scheme of concurrent jurisdiction, the federal plaintiff should be allowed to adjudicate his
claim in federal court not because the federal forum is judicially
determined to be better-such a decision would represent a direct affront to a congressional determination to the contrary-but rather because the state, by instituting an action in
its own court, should not be permitted to deny the individual a
right the Congress has given the plaintiff, the right of immediate
access to a federal court.
IV.

THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL PARITY

Thus far, I have argued that judicial forum allocation decisions predicated upon evaluations of institutional equivalence
between state and federal courts are unsound. This is because of:
(1) the largely illusory character of criteria for measurement of
institutional parity, and (2) the essential commitment of forum
allocation questions to the Congress. Thus, the Court's task,
rather than formulating forum allocation rules itself, is to exercise deference and follow the lead of Congress.
Yet, it could be argued that in some instances the Court has
ignored the above formulation of proper Court-Congress relations
with no resultant adverse effects on our federal system."5 If the
forum allocation decisions of the judiciary were similarly innocuous, despite their fallacious reasoning, the points raised in this
article would be largely dissipated;"' however, this is not the
case. Judicial involvement in forum allocation decisions under
the rubric of comparative institutional analysis of equivalence is
114. See notes 10 & 11 supra.
115. The situation I have in mind is the Court's development of the federal question
doctrine. While the doctrine has developed in an artificial manner, the general dimensions of the doctrine have been beneficial. See notes 77-84, 99-100 and accompanying text
supra.
116. Cf. Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE L.J. 161
(1930).
For that matter, by what may seem a strange method to those who do
not understand the theory of the Common Law, it is precisely some of those
cases which have been decided on incorrect premises or reasoning which have
become the most important in the law. New principles, of which their authors
were unconscious or which they have misunderstood, have been established
by these judgements. Paradoxical as it may sound, the law has frequently
owed more to its weak judges than it has to its strong ones. A bad reason may
often make good law.
Id. at 163.
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so fraught with danger to the continued viability of meaningful
judicial decisionmaking that any suggestion of its propriety must
be stilled.
Acceptance of generalized institutional analysis would be
disadvantageous to the courts in two ways. First, a judicial willingness to accept cases based upon a finding of the greater institutional competence of one forum over another potential forum
would call into question judicial integrity and seriously erode a
necessary bastion of judicial independence-popular support for
the judiciary. Second, the need for forum allocation decisions is
only present where the "correct" result can be foretold and it can
reasonably be anticipated that the closed-out forum would reach
the incorrect result. Thus, if "correct" results cannot be foretold
in the type of sensitive case that raises the forum allocation
question, the search for institutional parity or disparity is
meaningless.
A.

The Image of the Judiciary in a Modern Political Society

Central to the argument of those who suggest federal superiority is the belief that access to the federal judiciary should be
favored because "between the two benches, state trial judges are
less likely to resolve arguable issues in favor of protecting federal
constitutional rights than are their federal brethren.""' The tone
of the argument implies that there is a need to better the odds
that the constitutional claimant will prevail. " ' Therefore, the
question that we must ask is whether providing a more favorable
forum for a particular kind of claimant is a desirable goal. It has
been acknowledged that "since constitutional decisions serve to
guide third persons . . .. the clarity and persuasiveness of judicial opinions in constitutional cases assume great importance.""'
It must also be acknowledged that it is equally important for the
117. Neuborne, supra note 16, at 1119-20.
118. Thus, Neuborne asserts: "However, by uncritically assuming parity, the Supreme Court has avoided the difficult, but critical, issue of whether concerns for federalism, efficiency, and caseload outweigh the importance of having constitutional claims
heard by the more sympathetic and competent forum." Id. at 1117-18; see id. at 1121
n.59, 1125 n.74. Neuborne's argument proceeds upon an implicit assumption that the
federal constitutional right is capable of definition, measurement and assignment to one
of the litigants. Although he concedes that major constitutional litigation does involve
right versus right questions, id. at 1119, I find it difficult to divorce the above statements
from the premise that some rights are clearly more equal than others and only federal
courts (because of their greater institutional competence) have the means of
identification.
119. Id. at 1123.
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litigants and third parties to believe that the decision rendered
came from an impartial tribunal. The moral force and acceptability of a decision will be greatest when it is made by one who
neither has, nor appears to have, a psychological commitment to
the result.
We cannot excise, to any significant extent, individual
predilections in judicial decisionmaking, nor should we necessarily attempt to do so. We can, and should, however, avoid consciously engrafting a result orientation into our judicial system
via a perceived partiality in deciding certain classes of cases. It
would constitute a serious error to create in this manner a psychological counterweight to the deliberative processes of judicial
decisionmaking. A perceived bias on the part of the judiciary
would lead to the erosion, if not the loss, of that fundamental
backbone of many decisions of constitutional magnitude-popular willingness to follow an unpopular decision.2 0 If
law is to achieve its objectives in society, it must not only be
just, but it must also appear just. Before men will submit to law,
they must believe that it is law, and not one man's opinion of
what should be law, to which they are submitting.
Disrespect for the judicial system borne out of a public perception of institutional favoritism would inevitably lead to a lessening of public willingness to abide by, and give allegiance to,
judicial decisions. 2 ' As Mr. Justice Holmes warned, there is but
slight awareness that a great part of our law is open to reconsideration with but a slight change in public attitudes.' This is not
to say that, as a general principle, a decision on the merits
120. The willingness of the general public to abide by unpopular decisions can be
explained to some extent by the greater confidence that the American public holds for
the Supreme Court as an institution than for either the Congress or the President. A 1975
Harris survey found confidence in the Court nearly twice as great as that held for the
Congress or the Executive. See The Harris Survey, "Record Lows in Public Confidence,"
released October 6, 1975, quoted in Riflind, Are We Asking Too Much of Our Courts, 70
F.R.D. 96, 99 n.4 (1976). Nevertheless, although public confidence in the Court exceeds,
for the present, that of the other branches, the general low levels of public confidence
(Supreme Court (26%), Congress (13%), Executive (13%)) indicate that public confidence
is a resource on the endangered values list.
121. Learned Hand captured the point nicely when he observed:
I often wonder whether we do not rest our hours too much upon constitutions,
upon laws and upon courts. These are false hopes; believe me these are false
hopes. Liberty lies in the hearts of men and women; when it dies there, . ..
no constitution, no law, no court can even do much to help it. While it lies
there it needs no constitution, no law, no court to save it.
L. HAND, THE Srmrr oF Lmawr 189-90 (3d ed. 1960).
122. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 466 (1897).
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should be based on the popular will, for that would substitute
expediency for principled decisionmaking.'23 Constitutional government and the popular will are often found to be at cross purposes. Nonetheless, our history has demonstrated a willingness
to tolerate minority rights and hence set constitutional government at a point of equilibrium that often frustrates the desires of
the majority.' 4
A major reason for this tolerance has been the belief imputed to most Americans that the judgments rendered by courts
reflect a national commitment to certain levels of moral rectitude-a national conscience, so to speak-arrived at through impartial reflection. Impartial reflection does not mean that a
judge will not view the proper resolution of the problem from the
perspective of his own values. It does mean, however, that a
judge will have no stake in the matter other than his moral commitment and that he will be honest with himself and, to the best
of his ability, confront his own values. He can then assess the
problem from the perspective of attempting to arrive at a reasonable solution in light of his knowledge of his own predilections
and of the consequences of his decision.
Thus, it is important to distinguish popular acceptance of
judicial decisions, which measures the effectiveness of the decision by popular compliance, from popular acceptance of the
court as an institution. Although the populace is perhaps not always so discriminating as to separate totally the decision itself
(which they do not like) from the methodology by which the
decision was reached, they are likely to accept the decision for
so long as the decisionmaking process remains above reproach.
On the other hand, a judicial process perceived as being partial
can hardly be expected to advance the acceptability of decisions which adversely affect significant portions of the body
politic.
123. The need to consider public attitudes does not, of course, provide an ultimate
guide for decisionmaking. Law, however, must have a practical side. Even if the public
does not possess a philosophical right to disobey, it invariably possesses the power to
disobey and to work a reordering of social policies. Consequently, judicial decisionmaking
which increasingly takes on more than mere private dispute resolution, must be increasingly sensitive to the public reception its decisions will receive. The Court has no actual
power to effectuate its decrees by force or by control of the purse. Its only real power is to
compel acceptance by its position and prestige. The Court can be neither totally philosophical nor crassly pragmatic. It must judiciously attempt to reach reasonable accommodations of competing social policies without becoming overly political in the process,
for, if it ever does become overtly political, it would soon lose not only its prestige, but
also its power to the more politically adept institutions of our national government.
124. See generally Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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In a viable system of constitutional adjudication, the public
must perceive the judiciary as fair and impartial, else the resulting decision will be tinged rightly or wrongly, with the appearance of unfairness. An unexamined willingness to predicate development of constitutional doctrine upon recourse to an
institutionalized system of perceived doctrinal bias will, in the
end, call into question the very ability of the courts to provide
impartial solutions to problems of constitutional magnitude. If
the judiciary's solution to the problem of a perceived state
prejudice is to counter that prejudice with a federal bias, the solution is not very satisfactory. 2 '
B.

The Limits of Judicial Decisionmaking in a Federal
System of Government

Those who would urge courts to use institutional criteria to
make forum allocation decisions are basically instrumentalists.
They believe the courts have a basic social goal-enhancing constitutional claims made by individuals against the sovereign
power of the state' 2 -and in their eyes, institutional competence
may be measured or assessed by how well courts have achieved
that social goal.' Thus, notwithstanding the prior arguments,
one could suggest that evaluation of institutional competence is
not complex; it merely requires correlation of court performance
against the attainment of social goals. Moreover, it could be argued that courts set goals all the time and that therefore courts
should not be powerless to aid the attainment of those goals by
channeling litigation into appropriate fora. In conclusion, it
could be argued that everything I have said ignores what many,
if not most, of those involved with the judicial system believe-that the identical case will receive different treatment and
reach a correspondingly different result in state court than the
same case in federal court, and that the federal courts are a more
favorable forum for the adjudication of questions involving constitutional guarantees.' Indeed, these are common assumptions
125. "One of the most fundamental social interests is that the law shall be uniform
and impartial. There must be nothing in the action that savors of prejudice ... , arbitrary whim, or fitfulness." B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESs 112 (1921).
126. See note 118 and accompanying text supra.
127. See Linde, supra note 52, at 229-30.
128. The potential judicial power of the United States over federal question
cases must necessarily be extremely broad. The situations in which a sympathetic forum may be required for the vindication of national rights cannot
always be foreseen, and there must be power under the Constitution to pro-
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among litigators.'2 9

While the above arguments are. formidable, they do not provide sufficient support for a doctrine justifying forum allocation
rules based upon judicial evaluation of the institutional competence of alternative state and federal tribunals. Instead, when
fully examined, the arguments are shown to rely mainly upon
theoretical abstractions which, although provocative, have little
utility when applied to a real judicial system.
The primary concern of those who advocate measuring institutional competence to decide particular types of cases is the
possibility that the state court decision will be different in kind,
not that the decision will be different in degree. Of course, geographic and cultural considerations can legitimately form a part
of doctrinal development so that diversity and experimentation
within limits of reason will not only be tolerated, but also encouraged. In the long run, one should expect differences in degree among similar cases arising out of state and federal courts
to the same extent as one would expect differences among similar cases arising out of the various federal circuits. And, as with
the certiorari policy of the Supreme Court, small differences
would be tolerated until or unless they amounted to important
conflicts or differences in kind.
Concern over the likelihood that the state court will render a
decision that is different in kind creates a basic problem for the
advocates of judicially determinable institutional equivalence. In
the absence of a factual showing of state court inability to provide a full and fair opportunity to be heard, the proponents of
that theory could substantiate their concern only if they could
establish in advance the "correct" answer to the problem; otherwise, the state decision is as likely to be correct as the federal
decision only different. This is commonly overlooked, perhaps
vide for those eventualities.
Mishkin, supra note 100, at 162.
129. Thus, Professor Neuborne stated:
As a civil liberties lawyer for the past ten years, I have pursued a litigation strategy premised on two assumptions. First, persons advancing federal
constitutional claims against local officials will fare better, as a rule, in a
federal, rather than a state, trial court. Second, to a somewhat lesser degree,
federal district courts are institutionally preferable to state appellate courts
as forums in which to raise federal constitutional claims. I know of no empirical studies that prove (or undermine) those assumptions. Yet, they frequently
shape the forum selection strategy in constitutional cases today as they have
in the past.
Neuborne, supra note 16, at 1115-16 (footnotes omitted).
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because most legal writing has the benefit of hindsight and a judicial statement of what the "correct" answer is. Nevertheless,
the perception that a particular court is sympathetic to a constitutional claim necessitates foreknowledge of how the claim ought
to be resolved. This makes the institutional parity argument particularly troublesome because it rests upon the untested, yet
necessarily implicit, assumption that the constitutional claim of
one party is a priori valid and should prevail. Thus, the theory
requires that the whole system of judicial review be restructured
or modified so the predetermined meritorious constitutional
claims of some will not suffer or be chilled by delayed
recognition.
If we could foretell with certainty, and with some consensus,
the proper resolution of constitutional claims, the institutional
parity evaluation approach might have some utility. Usually,
however, it is the very absence of certainty and consensus that
creates a constitutional case. When individuals have no disagreement about their rights and there is no dispute concerning the
exercise of their rights (certainty and consensus), there is no
need for judicial intervention. Such a view of the universe of
problems subject to constitutional adjudication is extremely narrow, however, and would provide solutions only to the easy cases
involving clear, accepted rights versus clear, acknowledged
wrongs. A judicial system that can only find justification when
directed at the moral leper of the community hardly validates
itself. Adversaries can perhaps safely view all dispute adjudication from a right versus wrong perspective but it is doubtful
whether the courts can adopt such a perspective unless they
could tolerate being perceived publicly as adversaries. Such a
public perception would be undesirable for the obvious reason
that it would destroy the appearance of impartiality so vital to
the judicial role.
In our present day society, it is not the problem of the clear
right versus the clear wrong that presents the hard judicial case.
Rather, the truly hard case which must be subjected to constitutional scrutiny is the problem of the alleged right versus the alleged right. Although we may philosophize on what the result
should be and whether the result reached was correct from a
moral, as opposed to a critical, perspective,""0 we rarely know
130. I would distinguish moral from critical analysis on the following basis. Critical
analysis implies neutral or impartial observation of the essential factors to be considered
in the process of rendering the decision. Recognizing that criticism can never be truly
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before the decision is rendered which of the alleged rights was
preferred and which was negligible or perhaps even false. 3 ' And
after the decision is rendered, we know only in a descriptive
sense what the "correct" decision is-that reached by the
court-but we perhaps never know in a normative sense what
the "correct" decision ought to have been. 32
Nevertheless, strong arguments are being made that single,
correct answers do exist. The most vocal proponent of the argument is Professor Dworkin"3 whose analysis seems primarily directed at legitimating the judicial process by showing that "the
law," rather than unbridled judicial discretion, controls in constitutional adjudications. 3 4 The case he makes, however, is also
capable of extrapolation to the issue of forum allocation. In other
words, it might be argued that if there exist "right" answers to
which claimants are entitled, the judicial system ought to enhance the movement of litigation to those fora most likely (because of greater, identifiable institutional competence) to reach
the "right" answer.
Yet, notwithstanding Professor Dworkin's able presentation,
his "right answers" thesis is problematic for two reasons. First,
Dworkin's analysis often seems to equate a well-reasoned, logically correct answer with a necessarily right answer.' Such an
neutral, critical analysis presupposes that interest, bias or prejudice be frankly acknowledged and discounted by the reviewer to the extent possible. See Miller & Howell, The
Myth of Neutrality in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 27 U. CHI. L. REv. 661, 664-71 (1960).
Moral analysis, on the other hand, begins from a set perspective from which the problem
is viewed. See D. RICHARDS, THE MORAL CRITICISM OF LAW 52, 59 (1977). In essence, moral
analysis develops a value standard while critical analysis is methodological in
orientation.
131. In this context, a "correct" decision which protects individual rights envisions
the use of the term "right" in a legal rather than moral or jurisprudential sense.
For legal purposes a right is only a hypostasis of a prophecy-the imagination
of a substance supporting the fact that the public force will be brought to
bear upon those who do things said to contravene it-just as we talk of the
force of gravitation accounting for the conduct of bodies in space.

Holmes, Natural Law, 32 HARV. L.
LEGAL PAPERS 310, 313 (1921).
132.
pute, 75
133.
134.
135.

REV.

40, 42 (1918), reprinted in 0.

HOLMES, COLLECTED

See Soper, Legal Theory and the Obligation of a Judge: The HartiDworkin DisMICH. L. REv. 473, 473-74 (1976).
Dworkin, No Right Answer? 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 (1978).

See R.

DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY

68-69 (1977).

See Dworkin, supra note 133, at 3:
If it is true that an exchange of promises either does or does not constitute a valid contract, and that someone sued in tort either is or is not liable
in damages, and that someone accused of a crime either is or is not guilty,
then at least every case in which these issues are dispositive has a right answer. It may be uncertain and controversial what that right answer is, of
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equation confuses the judge's obligation to decide by a reasonable process with the obligation to reach an objectively "correct"
decision. Second, Dworkin fails to prove his contention that even
a skeptical empiricist must agree that there are "correct" answers to controversial questions,'36 because the hypotheticals
upon which Dworkin premises his proof ignore the basic requirement of constitutional disputes-meaningful controversy.
Meaningful controversy cannot exist if, as Professor Dworkin contends, one party, and only one party, comes into court with "an
institutionalright to the decision of the court."1 3 In this section,
I will explore these two basic objections to Professor Dworkin's
theory.
Professor Dworkin's most recent defense of the "right answer" theory'38 deals primarily with establishing right answers
when the choice is between alternative factual hypotheses. Thus,
we must first ask whether Dworkin can validly extend the theory
to other aspects of judicial decisionmaking in which the choice is
between principles and theories.'39 Dworkin describes in another
work, for example, the intellectual processes by which a judge
finds the correct answer to hard cases. First, the judge must
fashion a theory to govern his use of existing institutional materials, such as common law precedents, statutes and the Constitution.'40 Next, he must develop a set of principles "that builds a
bridge between the general justification of the practice of precedent, which is fairness, and his own decision about what that
general justification requires in some particular hard case."" Finally, he must proceed to the "correct" answer by means of "arguments generated by principles.""'
Yet, Professor Dworkin's judge cannot convince anyone that
his decision is uniquely correct or even necessarily better than
other equally well-reasoned answers simply by virtue of the
course, just as it is uncertain and controversial whether Richard III murdered
the princes. It would not follow from that uncertainty that there is no right
answer to the legal question, any more than it seems to follow from the uncertainty about Richard that there is no right answer to the question whether he
murdered the princes.
136. Id.at 25-26.
137. R. DWORKIN, supra note 134, at xii (emphasis added).
138. Dworkin, supra note 133, passim.
139. Dworkin's theory of adjudication is outlined in R. DWORKIN, supra note 134, at
81-130.
140. Id.at 116-17.
141. Id.at 116.
142. Id. at 86.
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power of the inclusiveness and order of his methodology. Instead,
his methodology is but a step, albeit a necessary one, to the formation of a reasoned expression of opinion on any matter. That
the judge's opinion is law only results from his station. The
methodological process itself is not peculiar to legal decisionmaking; it is endemic to all learned pastimes, for without reasoned discussion, meaningful communication is largely
impossible.
Dworkin correctly notes that it is in the controversial "hard
cases" that the right answer thesis faces the most trying examination.' Dworkin nonetheless denies that controversial questions present the judge with anything approaching a Hobson's
choice. Rather, he maintains that a "correct" answer exists and
that it is simply the task of the conscientious judge to find it. To
demonstrate the legitimacy and nature of the process, Professor
Dworkin analogizes to a situation involving participants in a literary game wherein a group of critics proposes to discuss David
Copperfield as if that book involved real people.' 4
Dworkin notes that the facts in this literary game are not
"hard" facts in the sense of being scientifically demonstrable,
but rather facts treated as established because of the logical coherence of the participants' arguments.
[This exercise] does require the assumption, I think, that
there are facts of narrative consistency, like the fact that the
hypothesis that David had a sexual relationship with Steerforth provides a more satisfactory explanation of what he subsequently did and thought than the hypothesis that he did
not.
That is not, I take it, a hard fact. It is not the sort of fact
that is even in principle demonstrable by ordinary scientific
methods. . . . In some cases, the argument will be so strong
for a particular proposition, no doubt, that we should say that
any participant who did not agree with that proposition was
simply incompetent at the exercise. In other cases, we should
not say this at all; we should say that there is so much to be
said on both sides that competent participants might reasonably disagree.'"5
Dworkin then has an empirical philosopher enter the discussion and declare the game worthless because it does not deal in
143. Dworkin, supra note 133, at 23.
144. Id.at 19-20.
145. Id.at 25.
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"hard" facts. Dworkin suggests that even this philosopher, were
he to join the game, would soon develop principles of narrative
consistency by which he could rank the hypotheses of the various
participants in order of plausibility.' 6 Dworkin intends to
demonstrate that given the operative rules and parameters of
any game, it is possible to discern the "best" answer or proposition. Dworkin analogizes the process of adjudication to the literary game because it too does not deal with "hard" facts and because it proceeds by means of ranking arguments to-determine
the right answer, the answer which best fits the relevant legal
materials.
We need not object to Dworkin's contention that certain
facts may logically be accepted as established without scientific
proof simply because they are supported by the better argument.
For example, if we see footprints in the snow we may construct a
thesis reaching the conclusion that someone has walked through
the snow. We cannot unequivocally prove that fact, but we can
construct a compelling, rational argument that the existence of
the footprints is most likely to be explained by that thesis than
by others. We can also accept Dworkin's observation that participants in an argument, even our skeptical philosopher, would
be inclined to rank the respective hypotheses. The question is
whether we can accept Dworkin's conclusion that by ranking the
various arguments and ultimately arriving at an answer, the participants have necessarily found the "best" answer and thus
proven that right answers do exist.
Dworkin's thesis turns on a subtle use of the term "right"
answer. For him, an answer is correct not because it is inherently
correct, as for example, a proposition that is self-evident;"' but
because it is the best-reasoned solution to a controversial case.
Thus, the "correct" answer is the one reached by the best reasoned methodology. In other words, the best-reasoned answer becomes the answer.
Now I believe Dworkin's suggestion that methodology is the
146. Id.
147. In the pure Lockean sense, a "self-evident truth" was an uncontrovertible proposition: "The mind cannot but assent to such a proposition as infallibly true, as soon as
it understands the terms." 2 LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 227
(Fraser ed. 1894). In the realm of constitutional adjudications there would appear to be
few "self-evident truths." Indeed, Professor Dworkin's use of a ranking methodology cannot be squared with any view that his correct answer theory rests upon a proposition that
the right answer is "self-evident."
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prime component of a legally correct decision is accurate,' 5 yet I
differ with his suggestion that a consensus on ranking of arguments can be achieved or that such a consensus necessarily
transmutes an argument into a theorem. The need to choose between alternatives does not mean that one of the alternatives is
necessarily better than the other; they may be equally good
or bad. Unfortunately, the "right" answer terminology carries
the connotation of moral certainty and moral obligation. Yet, such
certainty is truly illusory, for it is not necessarily true that shared
agreement on the proper ranking of arguments is any real evidence of the intrinsic worth of the arguments, although it may reflect the worth of the argument qua argument.
Moreover, once we take the "controversial" problem out of
the realm of a literary game and place it in a real context, one in
which "controversy" has real meaning and impact, the possibility of reaching anything other than a transitory consensus dissipates. For example, the correctness of setting a culprit free because the constable has blundered in collecting evidence is
neither analytically nor morally clear, particularly because a so.cial cost is extracted whether the culprit is incarcerated or set
free. Thus, it is meaningless to say that a decision which either
narrowly or expansively construes the exclusionary rule is the
correct decision. 4 9
Neither is it morally clear that the mother's bodily integrity
and privacy outweigh the value of the fetal existence. Whether
these values are loosely characterized as qualities or given the
status of rights or entitlements, in attempting to strike the balance, the judiciary must make a decision which enhances some
alternatives and impairs others. Lost beneath the controversy
engendered by such decisions'50 is the evident fact that these de148. Dworkin is not as explicit in his emphasis on methodology as I am; however, his
thesis certainly suggests that methodology is the key to reaching the "correct" answer.
149. That the exclusionary rule rests upon deterrence criteria and not moral principles seems accepted by the Court. Consider the Court's refusal to give retroactive effect
to Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), wherein the exclusionary rule was articulated and
applied to the states. The Court rested its decision on policies of deterrence, not rights of
individuals. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636-40 (1965). See also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 492 (1976); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 414-15
(1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The cost-benefit analysis undertaken by the Court in
recent years certainly belies any claim that the Court's application of the exclusionary rule
rests upon moral criteria. See Green, Stone v. Powell: The Hermeneutics of the
Burger Court, 10 CREIGHTON L. REv. 655 (1977).
150. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). In Wade and its companion case,
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), the Court held that the right of privacy recognized in
prior cases was "broad" enough to encompass a woman's decision whether to terminate
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cisions constitute trade-offs. For example, the Supreme Court's
delineation of periods in which state intervention in a mother's
decision to terminate a pregnancy is permitted'
represents
nothing more than an attempt to come to a decision which is
both reasonable under the complex circumstances and consistent
with accepted generalities. ' 2 This sort of solution might be the
most that can reasonably be expected of courts staffed by ordinary mortals who are called upon to solve problems of life and
death. Consequently, we should not blindly accept such a trade
off as the morally correct decision any more than we would in
the case of the exclusionary rule. Such a decision may be "defensible," but it is no substitute for the "right" decision that instrumentalists need but cannot find.
If the proponents of result orientation cannot point to a correct solution which the court should reach a priori, of what importance for purposes of forum allocation are institutional
proclivities to decide a case one way or another? Unless we are
willing to resurrect the Blackstonean view that law is discovered
and not made, or to indulge in the fiction that answers to complex questions are written on the Constitution in invisible ink
which only the most institutionally competent court can discern,
we must recognize that the definitively "correct" decision is an
illusion. There are often a number of alternatives within the
range of reason that may be selected with propriety by a court of
competent jurisdiction.
The absence of foreseeable, single right answers does not by
her pregnancy.
151. The Court divided the human gestation period into three trimesters. It discussed the rights of the mother and the rights of the state to intervene to preserve the life
of the fetus against a standard which viewed the mother's right to privacy and bodily
integrity as fundamental and subject to infringement only if the state could demonstrate
a compelling interest. During the first trimster of pregnancy, the state may not interfere
with the mother's basic decision as to whether to carry the fetus. During the second trimester, the state, though it is still precluded from interfering with the basic decision
whether to carry the fetus, may require certain procedures to promote safe abortions. It is
only in the last trimester, once the fetus becomes viable in the sense that it is capable of
assisted survival outside the womb, that the state may interfere with a mother's decision
to terminate the pregnancy.
The Court in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), was silent as to why the fetal interest was deemed so inconsequential prior to viability. Nor were the trimester periods of
demarcation themselves adequately defined and justified, except with reference to the
concept of fetal viability and risk to the mother accompanying either pregnancy termination or childbirth. See Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82
YALE L.J. 920, 924-26 (1973). See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 9, at 921-34.
152. L. TRIBE, supra note 9, at 929.
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any means denigrate the judicial process. Even if one is not convinced of the absolute correctness of the particular view expressed, one should still be able to accept it as a good decision
entitled to allegiance and respect as long as it is reasonable and
arrived at by a rational process. To conclude that one should not
be bound by reasonable decisions diminishes the value of the
finality accorded judicial judgments and assumes that such decisions are reached by disingenuous and arbitrary means. Hence, if
there is any room for evaluation of institutional competency, it is
limited to ascertaining whether institutionally the system proceeds to issue resolution by rational procedures. To ask more intrudes upon Congress' right under article III to allocate the federal judicial power between state and federal courts; to require
process of its very
less deprives the judicial
essence-reasonableness.
V.

CONCLUSION

The judiciary's use of institutional competency criteria to
render forum allocation decisions indicates a failure to accord
the proper respect for the congressional determinations of comity
and federalism which are implicit in any statutory scheme vesting concurrent jurisdiction in state and federal courts. Although
questions of institutional parity might enter into the forum allocation decision as a component of a legitimate decision to provide claimants with a bench better equipped to cope with particularized problems involving federal interests, it does not
necessarily follow that the judiciary may properly make such determinations. The fallacy of the institutional competency arguments lies not so much in the view of equivalence, or the lack
thereof, but in the failure to recognize that the mere existence of
a factor potentially relevant to forum allocation decisions does
not ipse dixit establish that courts are the proper political entity
to evaluate the problem and strike the balance.
The major problem with the use of institutional parity criteria is the assumption that the determination of institutional
competence is properly part of the judicial search for the "correct" decision. The history of Congress' allocation of the federal
judicial power created by article III, however, demonstrates, if
anything, that the various congressional grants of exclusive and
concurrent jurisdiction over matters of federal interest are the
result of political responses to the perceived necessities of an era,
rather than a grand design to obtain "correct" results. The
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fundamental flaw in the federal superiority argument is not just
its failure to define criteria that would demonstrate the existence
or nonexistence of institutional parity between federal and state
court systems, but also its failure to appreciate the inherently political context in which congressional determinations of forum allocation are made. Once Congress makes those determinations,
it is particularly inappropriate for the courts to modify that determination by way of generalized doctrines that focus upon considerations other than the fairness of the hearing actually accorded the litigant in the congressionally acceptable court.

